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ABSTRACT
Custody is, in essence, a service consisting in 
holding (and normally administering) securities 
on behalf of third parties. In step with the 
growth of sophisticated financial markets, 
custody has evolved into a complex industry no 
longer characterised by physical safekeeping 
but by a range of information and banking 
services. Given the multi-tier structure of the 
industry, custody services are provided by a 
variety of intermediaries. This paper describes 
the development of the custody industry and the 
structure of the custody services market. It also 
discusses the risks involved in custody and the 
challenges the industry is facing, particularly in 
the European context.
Key words: custody industry, securities 
settlement, systemic risk, custodian banks, 
global custodians.
JEL classification: G15, G21, L225
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INTRODUCTION
The securities market represents a large and 
growing part of financial markets. Custody as 
an industry originated with investors needing to 
keep securities certificates in a safe place, 
usually a bank with large vaults. The custody 
industry evolved, in step with the growth of 
sophisticated financial markets, into a complex 
industry no longer characterised by physical 
safekeeping but by a range of information and 
banking services.
The purpose of this paper is to inform investors, 
policy-makers, financial market participants 
and the interested public in general about the 
custody industry, and about the nature and 
evolution of the demand for and supply of 
custody services. There is currently a lively 
debate, particularly in Europe, among policy-
makers, regulators and market participants 
about the role of market infrastructures and 
custodians, in the context of promoting 
competition and efficiency. This paper aims to 
contribute to the current debate without taking 
any policy position, but rather by shedding 
some light on similarities and differences 
among purchasers and providers of custody 
services, thus contributing to a better 
understanding of the functions performed by 
the various industry players. Most of the 
concepts and descriptions provided are valid 
for the custody industry in general; however, in 
the interests of the ongoing European debate, 
we discuss some subjects specific to this region 
more extensively.
The paper is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 
gives an overview of the origins and the 
evolution of the custody industry, tracing the 
development of central depositories, cross-
border custody and the transformation of the 
industry from physical safekeeping to 
information and banking services. Chapter 2 
discusses the supply of custody services. It 
describes the market size, market structure, 
trends, competition among service providers, 
some impediments to competition, and the 
providers’ respective strategies. Chapter 3 looks 
at the demand for custody services 
from different segments of investors and 
their intermediaries, and provide a description 
of their varied and specific service needs. 
Chapter 4 analyses the risks involved in custody. 
It highlights the operational, financial and legal 
risks incurred by both the providers and the 
users of custody services, and describes 
common techniques used to mitigate them. It 
also discusses systemic risks caused by the 
operational or financial failure of a custodian. 
Chapter 5 describes the future challenges for 
the industry. Finally, Chapter 6 summarises the 
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1  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CUSTODY 
INDUSTRY
1.1  THE ORIGINS OF CUSTODY 
Custody – in essence a service consisting in 
holding (and normally administering) securities 
on behalf of third parties – has its roots in 
physical safekeeping. In the days when 
securities existed only in paper form, investors 
needed a safe place to keep these certificates of 
value. That safe place could either be their own 
premises (which however then needed to be 
adequately protected) or those of a safekeeping 
service provider (banks with their vaults were a 
natural choice at that time).  
Nowadays, custody is offered by a variety of 
institutions, primarily by brokers, commercial 
banks and investment banks.1 These providers 
have developed specialised services that cater 
to different customer segments.
1.1.1 CUSTODIAN BANKS
As just explained, banks were the natural 
providers of physical safekeeping services as 
they would usually already have strong vaults 
for the holding of cash and other valuables 
taken for deposit.
Having the physical securities in safekeeping 
enabled the “custodian bank” to provide 
additional services related to settlement and 
asset servicing. Although custodian banks’ 
main function today is no longer safekeeping 
physical securities, the scope of their services 
in settlement and asset servicing remains 
relatively unchanged:
–  When securities are bought or sold, the 
custodian takes care of the delivery and 
receipt of securities against the agreed 
amount of cash. This process, i.e. the 
exchange of securities against funds, is 
commonly called “settlement”.  
–  Holding securities in an investor’s portfolio 
attracts benefits, rights and obligations; the 
services provided by the custodian to ensure 
the investor receives that to which he is 
entitled are commonly called “asset 
services”. These services usually fall into 
several broad categories: collection of 
dividends and interest; corporate actions 
such as rights issues, re-denominations or 
corporate reorganisations; payment and/or 
reclaim of tax; voting at shareholders’ 
meetings by proxy.  
Much of the work done in asset servicing, 
therefore, involves a custodian acting as an 
information intermediary, communicating 
between issuers and securities holders. While 
the investing customer could have performed 
the related work itself, it is more convenient for 
it to entrust these activities to a specialist. 
Custodian banks have developed economies of 
scale to provide services to their customers at a 
price that is less than what the customer would 
spend, and probably faster and with less 
operational errors than if the customer were to 
do the same work itself. In each market, there 
are usually a number of local custodian banks 
that provide custody services, thus giving 
customers a choice of services and prices. When 
banks provide custody services in multiple 
markets through one service agreement with 
customers, they are called “global custodian” 
banks.
1.1.2 INTRODUCTION OF CENTRAL SECURITIES 
DEPOSITORIES
With high trading volumes, the movement of 
massive amounts of physical securities could 
cause delays and errors that would result in 
more delays. Severely delayed settlement of 
securities transactions could give rise to 
liquidity problems in the financial markets. 
Physical certificates could also increase the 
probability of fraud and forgeries.  
Therefore, at the urging of national authorities 
and central banks, some markets set up central 
securities depositories (CSDs) many decades 
1  Investment banks are referred to as investment firms in EU 
legislation because not all of them may have a banking 
licence.7
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ago, to immobilise the securities certificates for 
the whole market, so that physical movements 
would be eliminated.2 Advances in technology 
enabled other markets to dematerialise, whereby 
securities would only exist in electronic form. 
Whether by immobilisation or dematerialisation, 
securities are transferred from one holder to 
another in CSDs by “book entry settlement” 
between securities account holders, which are 
commonly called members or participants. 
These institutions operate as central providers 
for the entire market and are expected to treat 
all users equitably. Some markets set up CSDs 
only after having suffered through “paper 
crises”, or after adopting best practice 
recommendations by important international 
organisations such as the Group of Thirty.3
In markets where securities were legally 
required to be in paper form, enabling legislation 
needed to be passed to recognise ownership of 
securities in electronic form and change of legal 
title via book-entry settlement. As a general 
rule, one issue of a security is immobilised in 
one CSD only, as it is the most efficient 
arrangement. 
In some markets, immobilisation was not 
mandatory and investors were given the option 
to hold physical certificates if they wished. In 
other markets dematerialisation was mandatory, 
so that the entire issue was held by the CSD in 
electronic form only. Markets that could not 
dematerialise because of legal requirements for 
securities to be in physical form might have 
opted to increase the efficiency of immobilisation 
by adopting global certificates, where one piece 
of paper represented an entire issue.
The establishment of CSDs generally took place 
at the urging of national authorities (Treasuries, 
central banks) with broad market support, by 
brokers and banks alike, as the merits of their 
efficiency were obvious. In some markets, the 
CSDs were set up by the exchange as a service 
to their broker members. In other markets, the 
CSDs were set up with investments by custodian 
banks, which shifted their focus from physical 
safekeeping to the provision of information on 
customers’ transactions and securities holdings. 
Issuers and investors were usually not directly 
involved in the founding of these central service 
providers, as it was typically their intermediaries 
which had the vested interest in finding a 
solution to eliminate the inefficiencies of 
moving physical paper.
The first and the last: The first immobilisation 
of securities in central institutions to facilitate 
settlement without physical deliveries happened 
at the end of the 19th century in Germany; these 
institutions were called Kassenvereine. The 
CSD in France, the Caisse centrale de dépôts 
et de virements des titres (CCDVT), was 
established in 1942. The majority of the other 
European CSDs were established in the 1960s 
onwards. The establishment of CREST in 1996 
in the UK finally completed the immobilisation 
of securities in all the European Union (EU) 
Member States prior to enlargement in 2004. 
Investors in some markets, however, still have 
the option to hold physical securities if they 
prefer. 
In the US, the paperwork crisis in the securities 
industry that developed in the late 1960s served 
as a catalyst that generated deep concern within 
Congress and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and accelerated the 
immobilisation and book-entry transfer of 
securities by a central service provider. The 
Depository Trust Company (DTC) was 
established in 1973 and enabling legislation 
was passed in 1975, under the Securities Acts 
Amendments, which encouraged financial 
institutions to use central depositories and 
created a unified national market system.
2  The reason why a new entity was created to take up this function 
(instead of entrusting it to one of the custodian banks already in 
the market) was to avoid favouring any specific custodian bank 
(which would have happened if all securities were centralised 
at one market participant only). CSDs were initially set up as 
market utilities serving all market participants.
3  The Group of Thirty is a private, non-profit, international body 
composed of very senior representatives of the private and public 
sectors and academia. It aims, inter alia, to deepen understanding 
of international economic and financial issues. In January 2003 
the Group released a report with twenty recommendations aimed 
at mapping the route to a more efficient global clearing and 
settlement infrastructure (see also www.group30.org).
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In Europe, Denmark was the first country to 
dematerialise securities in 1981. Belgium was 
the most recent European country to announce 
plans for dematerialisation. The United States 
has ongoing initiatives towards dematerialisation 
of securities.
National consolidation: In a number of markets 
in the EU, CSDs initially specialised by type of 
security: equities were immobilised in a CSD 
owned or affiliated with a stock exchange, and 
government bonds in a CSD operated by the 
central bank. In some markets the separate 
CSDs for equities and government bonds 
eventually merged, so that a single CSD would 
serve the entire national market. Even though 
national laws do not always give a CSD 
monopoly status, the CSD becomes a de facto 
monopoly in its home market. There has been 
no new entrant to a national market in the EU 
to challenge an incumbent CSD. In the US, the 
regional stock exchanges’ vertically integrated 
CSDs were gradually absorbed into DTC, a 
twenty-year process that began in 1976 and 
ended with the last integration taking place in 
1997, while the Federal Reserve still acts as 
CSD for US government issues.
Diversity: Since the primary purpose of CSDs 
was to immobilise securities and to enable the 
transfer of title by book-entry, most of them 
never went much beyond this basic function. 
However, because of scale economies, it was 
recognised that services could be more 
efficiently delivered by a central service 
provider. One of the most common of these 
services was that of central registrar, where the 
CSD holds the central record of ownership and 
provides the root of title. Some CSDs developed 
a range of services such as income collection 
from issuers and distribution to securities 
holders, notification of corporate actions, and 
even tax reporting and collection services for 
national authorities. Others offered a centralised 
securities lending service, as the CSD was best 
placed to match demand with supply given that 
they have a view of the entire market in their 
books. Usually, CSDs provide asset and 
securities lending services with little or no 
customisation by client, unlike those services 
offered by custodians. The legal and historical 
context of a CSD’s creation also affected what 
it did and how it did it. For example, in national 
markets where dematerialisation was 
implemented on a mandatory basis, CSD 
activities were typically precisely defined and 
strongly regulated. In some markets, CSDs 
have been granted banking licences, primarily 
for the purpose of holding a cash clearing 
account at the central bank where payments 
among CSD members were effected with 
finality. These CSDs typically are not allowed 
by regulation to extend credit to members. In 
some cases, however, national banking law 
does not differentiate types of banking licences, 
so, in principle, CSDs that have a banking 
licence in these jurisdictions are not prohibited 
from extending credit.
Common features: The constitution and range 
of CSD services has become highly diverse, but 
they do share some key common features. They 
are central service providers established with a 
common objective, which is to provide the 
definitive record of ownership and subsequent 
transfer of title and – through immobilisation of 
securities – to facilitate the central settlement 
of securities without the movement of physical 
certificates. CSDs are also similar in the specific 
status they are usually accorded in national 
regulations and their specific control and 
supervision by public authorities, due to their 
central role in the smooth functioning of the 
securities market, the proper transfer of title, 
registration of ownership, and ensuring the 
existence of securities. The particular 
importance of CSDs, as the cornerstones of any 
efficient settlement system, has progressively 
led to their supervision by national central 
banks and securities market authorities, which 
pay considerable attention to the prevention of 
systemic risk. Supervisors generally require 
CSDs to manage operational risks with robust 
mitigation measures and to avoid taking credit 
risks. Furthermore, where dematerialisation 
was implemented on a broad scale or mandatory 
basis, CSD activities have been defined and 
strongly regulated in their role as central 9
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safekeepers of dematerialised securities and 
operators of securities settlement systems. To 
ensure a harmonised approach on a global scale, 
the Committee on Payment and Settlement 
Systems (CPSS) and the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) have defined 19 recommendations for 
securities clearing and settlement systems, 
including considerable attention to the objective 
of good governance.  
1.1.3 INTERNATIONAL CSDs
A second type of CSD exists in the European 
Union: the so-called ICSDs Euroclear Bank and 
Clearstream Banking Luxembourg.4 They were 
originally set up, in 1968 and 1970 respectively, 
to immobilise Eurobonds and provide book-
entry settlement as an efficient alternative to 
moving bonds physically. The “international” 
aspect incorporates several characteristics: the 
Eurobond market not being a national market, 
the many currencies in which Eurobonds are 
denominated, and member admission rules that 
do not restrict the country of domicile.5
The Eurobond market: Eurobonds were 
introduced to the financial markets in the early 
1960s with the launch of internationally 
distributed and mainly US dollar-denominated 
bonds. “Originating as an offshore market, and 
not subject to the exclusive regulation of one 
government or group of governments, Euro-
securities initially benefited from the 
exploitation of inefficiencies in individual 
domestic markets. The introduction, in 1963, of 
the Interest Equalisation Tax in the USA – which 
had the effect of increasing the cost of raising 
funds in the US capital market for the foreign 
borrowers – is usually singled out as the 
development that gave the initial impetus to the 
Euro-securities”.6 In the late 1970s, shorter-
term instruments, Euro medium-term notes and 
Euro commercial paper, were added. It should 
be noted that the “Euro” part of this term refers 
to the type of security and not the euro (€) 
currency: it is commonly defined as a security 
issued outside the home market of the issuer 
and not subject to the issuer’s nor the country 
of issue’s domestic market regulations, domestic 
bond market conventions and domestic 
settlement practices. 
A “Euro” bond is a debt security that is:       
1)  underwritten and distributed by an 
international syndicate (whose members 
have registered offices in different states);
2) offered at issuance on a significant scale 
simultaneously to investors in more than 
one country (other than that of the issuer’s 
registered office).
This category of securities is sometimes 
described as “homeless and stateless”.  
With the introduction of the euro and the 
internationalisation of the financial markets, 
the distinction between Eurobonds commonly 
deposited with ICSDs and domestic bonds 
commonly deposited with CSDs has blurred. It 
is no longer always possible to differentiate the 
instruments, which can both be underwritten 
and distributed on a broad scale. As a result, the 
choice of the ICSDs as place of deposit for the 
Eurobonds is often driven by the balance 
between domestic and international placement, 
as well as market habits. Euro securities are 
deposited into both ICSDs upon issue and 
distributed to the securities’ underwriters, first 
investors or their intermediaries by book-entry 
according to their membership in either ICSD. 
The Eurobond market is the only market in the 
EU where more than one CSD exists for the 
same issue of securities.7 Because of this, they 
needed to have “common depositories” 
arrangements whereby they outsourced the 
physical safekeeping of securities to a number 
of banks called Common or Specialised 
4  Formerly Cedel SA.
5  The Swiss entity Sega Intersettle (SIS) also considers itself an 
international CSD. SIS is the result of the merger between the 
Swiss national securities depository Sega and a global custodian, 
Intersettle. The term ICSD and current market usage refer to the 
two long-established Eurobond CSDs only, and in this paper we 
also follow this convention.
6  P. Krijgsman (1994), page 5.
7  Outside the EU, India is another market where more than one 
CSD exists for the same issue of securities.
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Depositories. Issuers’ contractual relationships 
to ensure the integrity of their issues rested, 
however, with the ICSDs (so-called Current 
Global Note structure). Recently, the two ICSDs 
together with other market participants have 
developed a new arrangement, called the New 
Global Note, which can be used for issues of 
international debt securities in global bearer 
note form. Under the terms of the NGN, the 
legally relevant record of the indebtedness of 
the issuer will be maintained by the ICSDs. The 
ICSDs will enter into a direct contractual 
relationship with each issuer.8
A different business model: Although the ICSDs 
share the national CSDs’ common characteristic 
of having been established as central service 
providers to immobilise Euromarket securities 
and effect transfer of title via book-entry, the 
ICSDs differ from national CSDs in that they 
were both founded as for-profit ventures by 
commercial banks, Morgan Guaranty Trust 
Company of New York in the case of Euroclear 
and a consortium of European banks in the case 
of Cedel. They have from the start combined 
CSD functions and banking services, by 
combining book-entry transfer of securities and 
book-entry payment for those securities via 
cash accounts held by the ICSD bank. During 
most of the ICSDs’ history, the operator of the 
settlement system was separate from the 
commercial bank(s) providing cash financing, 
which were the original founders (respectively 
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York 
and the consortium of European banks). This 
distinction was abolished when Cedel and 
Euroclear obtained banking licences, 
respectively in 1995 and 2001. As a result, cash 
used for settlement must first be deposited in 
(or credit extended by) the ICSD bank. ICSDs 
offer banking services, such as securities 
financing, that involve credit risk taking. An 
important source of revenues for ICSDs is from 
banking services. National CSDs, on the other 
hand, even when they are for-profit ventures, as 
a rule and with rare exception do not provide 
banking services to ensure they are not exposed 
to unnecessary credit risk. The ICSD banks are 
supervised by banking authorities, and most 
national CSDs are overseen by the national 
central bank and other relevant authorities due 
to their systemic importance to the financial 
markets.
1.2  TRANSFORMATION OF THE CUSTODY 
INDUSTRY 
1.2.1 CUSTODY IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE
The immobilisation or dematerialisation of 
physical securities in CSDs should, in 
theory, eliminate the need for any investor 
to use custodians or brokers to safekeep 
physical securities. Under immobilisation or 
dematerialisation, safekeeping is reduced to a 
reconciliation activity, whereby the custodian’s 
task is to ensure that its holdings at the CSD are 
equivalent at all times to the amount of securities 
owned by its customers. Yet investors continue 
to use custodians, for several reasons:
Ineligibility: Some investors and market 
participants are not eligible to become a member 
of the CSD. Some CSDs only want members 
that are regulated, financially sound, have 
robust operational capabilities, and have the 
ability to continuously invest in technology that 
ensures straight-through processing. These 
membership criteria are primarily designed to 
minimise the probability of disruption to a 
CSD’s smooth functioning.
Intermediation solution: Even when investors 
and market participants could be a direct 
member of the CSD, they might still decide to 
buy the services of a custodian with economies 
of scale and expertise in the procedures of the 
CSD, market practices and the management of 
securities holders’ rights and entitlements. 
Intermediation enables a market participant to 
change fixed overheads into variable costs.
8  In order to be eligible as collateral for Eurosystem operations, 
an NGN will have to be held for safekeeping by one of the 
ICSDs, i.e. an entity that has been positively assessed by the 
Eurosystem. Further information about the NGN arrangement 
can be obtained from the websites of the ICSDs. Further 
information on the eligibility criteria can be found on the ECB’s 
website.11
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The fact that market participants can choose 
between being a member of the CSD or using a 
custodian bank might give some observers the 
impression that the CSD and custodian banks 
are in competition. However, since a custodian 
can only provide services in the CSD’s home 
market by holding customers’ securities at the 
CSD, it cannot offer the service at a more 
competitive price than that which it has to pay 
the CSD. ECSDA, in a recent letter to the ECB,9 
confirmed the different roles of custodians 
and CSDs: “The functions of a custodian are 
altogether different from those of a CSD in 
terms of the risk profile involved (including the 
extension of credit), the need to cope with 
non-standardised activities with much lower 
levels of automation achievable and the need 
to engage in activities normally considered as 
higher value added than the commoditised 
services ordinarily provided by CSDs.”
A more economically logical view is that a 
market participant chooses between using its 
own back office or using a custodian bank that 
could do the same work at a lower cost. The 
back-office functions at stake include asset 
9  European Central Securities Depositories Association (ECSDA) 
letter to the ECB on TARGET2-Securities, February 2007.






























Note: For illustrative purposes only. Not all intermediaries and end investors are shown.
servicing, such as collection of income, 
dividends, tax reclaims, voting at shareholder 
meetings, etc. These functions can be either 
undertaken by a market participant’s own back 
office, or performed by a custodian. The market 
participant’s back office is therefore the actual 
competitor of the custodian bank.
A similar economic decision is taken by various 
types of financial market intermediaries, which 
results in custody being characterised by multi-
tiered intermediation (see Figure 1). 
Specialised and banking services: The custodian 
bank provides services that are most efficiently 
performed by the same entity that holds the 
securities for investors and other financial 
intermediaries. These services fall into two 
broad categories: specialised reporting for a 
specific customer segment, such as investment 
funds, and banking services, such as intraday 
liquidity provision and securities financing, 
which most CSDs do not provide because it 
involves credit exposure.
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Table 1 lists six groups of services provided by 
custodian banks. It should be noted that some 
investment firms, though not constituted as 
banks, provide the same range of services to 
clients like retail investors and hedge funds.
1.2.2 CROSS-BORDER CUSTODY SERVICES
Most banks are custodians by nature: serving 
clients which invest on a domestic and cross-
border scale, they have to provide asset 
safekeeping services and related banking 
services. They may provide custody services 
internally or have recourse to third-party 
providers for all or some of the markets. 
Such third-party providers are commonly called 
“custodian banks” and have structured their 
custody offering in order to provide it to 
external clients, on a competitive basis. The US 
was the first market where custodian banks 
developed, and their level is still unmatched in 
other regions, as a large portion of the market 
(both domestic and cross-border) has gradually 
been externalised to third-party suppliers. 
Table 1 Services provided by custodian banks
Safekeeping 1) Ensuring that a record of title to the customer’s securities is maintained on the books of a higher-tier entity, and 
that the number of securities owned by the customer as recorded in the custodian books can always be delivered 
to the customer’s order.
Settlement 1) Transmitting customers’ securities receipt and delivery orders to a higher-tier entity and effecting or monitoring 
the associated payments.
Asset servicing Processing the rights and obligations associated with securities in safekeeping. This usually includes income 
and dividend collection, withholding tax processing and reclamation, proxy voting, corporate actions 
notifications, and statements of securities holdings.
Fund services Delivering specialised services for investment portfolios (funds), usually involving investment accounting, net 
asset valuation, performance measurement, compliance monitoring, and regulatory record keeping. May also 
include fund holder registration, subscription and redemption services.
Banking Taking deposits and providing services that involve credit exposure, usually intraday liquidity, lending money, 
and lending securities as principal or as agent with a guarantee to the lender. Collateral management is also 
usually provided.
In markets with a central counterparty, some custodian banks provide an intermediary service to trading firms 
that do not wish to access the central counterparty directly. This service, commonly called General Clearing 
Member, involves assuming obligations of the customers vis-à-vis the market’s central counterparty and hence 
is a credit risk-taking service.
Paying agent  Distributing, on behalf of the issuer, dividends, interest or principal redemptions to the securities holders or 
their financial intermediaries representatives. 
1) Although the market terminology also attributes “settlement” and “safekeeping” activities to CSDs, it is important to outline that 
the functions performed by CSDs differ from those described above:
–    Safekeeping by CSDs refers to the central deposit of an issue and the provision of the root of title, placing CSDs at the highest level 
of the holding chain, with a fiduciary responsibility to maintain at all times the balance of the issue and to effect the transfer of 
securities positions on the central register; 
–    Settlement by CSDs refers to the transfer of securities within the books of the central register. CSDs manage settlement systems and 
enact the regulations governing such systems. Settlement systems are agreements between participants with common rules and 
standardised arrangements for the execution of transfer orders and the provision of finality.  
As investors started purchasing securities 
issued in foreign markets, custodian banks and 
CSDs approached the new opportunities in 
several ways. The three categories listed below 
describe the ranges of markets covered by 
custodian banks which serve as a differentiating 
factor: 
Single-market custodians: Some custodians 
decide to specialise in their home market to 
serve domestic customers and inflow investment 
from foreign customers. They compete with the 
multi-direct custodians from other markets 
which have set up branches in their jurisdictions. 
These custodians are often referred to as “local 
custodians”, “agent banks” or “sub-custodians”, 
a variety of terms which reflects the same 
business reality.
Multi-direct custodians: This group tries to 
capture additional cross-border business by 
establishing a presence in multiple markets and 
obtaining direct membership in each market’s 
CSD. They compete with the established local 
custodians in that market for inflow as well as 13
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Figure 2 Securities services value chain
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1) An intermediary may purchase and supply multiple services in the value chain, sometimes via different subsidiaries. A supplier may 
purchase services from a higher-tier intermediary.
domestic business. Their customer base 
typically requires more in-depth local market 
expertise, proximity to local market 
infrastructures, and may also place a high 
importance in being able to select different 
providers in each market based on relationship, 
service and price.  
Global custodians: This group of custodians 
offers a one-stop-shop service, usually covering 
about 100 markets, and opts to appoint 
intermediaries to access many markets’ CSDs. 
They are able to capture cross-border custody 
business without incurring substantial set-up 
costs and ongoing fixed costs. Most global 
custodians began as large single-market 
custodians and expanded their market coverage 
to capture their domestic clients’ investments 
abroad. The global custodian business model 
appeals mainly to institutional investors which 
need convenience and consolidated reporting 
on their diverse international portfolio. In some 
larger markets, some global custodians may 
establish a physical presence and become direct 
members of the CSDs. In most cases, however, 
they appoint either a multi-direct or a single-
market provider in the local market to be their 
“sub-custodian”.
It is worth noting that outside the US, a 
significant share of the custody business is still 
performed by commercial banks, savings or 
cooperative banks to support their retail, 
brokerage and asset manager (intra-group) 
business.   
Table 2 lists the major global custodians which 
have specialised in third-party services. It shows 
that this business tends to be concentrated on 
some key players due to the economies of scale.
Table 3 lists the geographical coverage of 
multi-direct custodians in the various regions. 
The countries have been taken into account 
only when the custodian is a direct member of 
the CSD in that country. The institutions listed 
may also be global custodians and their 
geographical coverage, including both direct 
and indirect membership for a given market, 
usually amounts to 70-100 countries. 
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Table 2 Total assets under custody with the major global custodians
(USD billions)
Provider Total assets Managed directly Managed as 
sub-custodian
Reference date
  1 JPMorgan  12,900 12,721 179 30 Sep. 2006
  2 The Bank of New York 1) 12,170 12,170 30 Sep. 2006
 3 State  Street 2) 11,900 11,900 31 Dec. 2006
  4 Citigroup  9,142 1,492 7,650 1 June 2006
  5 BNP Paribas  4,760 2,156 2,604 31 Dec. 2006
 6 Mellon  Group 3) 4,569 4,369 200 31 Dec. 2006
  7 HSBC Securities Services  3,880 30 June 2006
  8 UBS AG  3,377 30 Sep. 2006
  9 Northern Trust  3,300 3,300 30 Sep. 2006
10 Société Générale  2,500 689 1,811 31 Mar. 2006
11 CACEIS Investor Services 2,316 1,887 429 31 Dec. 2006
12 RBC Dexia Investor Services  2,000 2,000 31 Dec. 2005
13 Investors Bank & Trust  1,950 1,673 277 30 June 2006
14 SIS SegaInterSettle AG 1,911 1,573 338 1 Jan. 2006
15 Brown Brothers Harriman  1,740 1,266 474 31 Dec. 2006
Total Top 15 78,415
Total Next 35  9,901
Aggregate:  USD billion 88,316
Source: ©globalcustody.net. Extract from source: www.globalcustody.net. The above extract depicts data from globalcustody.net Asset 
Tables as at 19 February 2007.  Service providers can submit their latest figures for the tables in real-time, so please refer to 
globalcustody.net for the most up-to-date and comprehensive data.
1) On 4 December 2006, The Bank of New York and Mellon Group (6th on list) announced their agreement to merge.
2) On 5 February 2007, State Street announced its acquisition of Investor Financial Services Corporation, owner of Investors Bank & 
Trust (13th on list).
3) Assets held by Mellon Group’s network include ABN AMRO Mellon, CIBC Mellon and Mellon Global Securities Services. 
Annexes 1 to 5 provide details on the most 
active local custodian banks in various regions 
(EU27, other European countries, Asia Pacific, 
Africa and Middle East, and Americas). All of 
these banks serve their clients via a direct 
access to the local infrastructure CSD.10
Central securities depositories 
In addition, CSDs have increasingly tried to 
broaden the scope of the instruments they 
process by covering not only the securities 
deposited in their books, but also foreign 
securities deposited with other CSDs, and by 
acting as intermediaries. CSDs may offer 
settlement, safekeeping and custody services 
for securities issued outside their own market 
and deposited with other CSDs. Most CSDs 
offer the service only for foreign securities with 
10  Information for Table 3 and the annexes is based on Global 
Custodian magazine’s “2006 Agent Banks in Major and 
Emerging Markets Survey”. The survey is based on nearly 
10,000 responses worldwide. A custodian must secure a 
minimum number of responses from institutional clients in each 
market in order to be listed in the survey. Some custodians who 
specialise in certain market segments, such as retail consumers, 
do not participate in this survey. Only surveyed markets are 
included in this chart, although there are other markets (usually 
small) with stock exchanges and custodians.
a secondary listing on that CSD’s national 
exchange. Other CSDs hold foreign securities 
for collateral management purposes in central 
bank monetary policy operations. In both cases, 
the activity in foreign securities remains limited 
and is driven by the fact that the CSD operates 
the securities settlement engine which processes 
the transactions executed on the exchange 15
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Table 3 Geographical coverage of selected multi-direct custodian banks in various regions








Citigroup 2 9 16 18 3 48
HSBC 11 4 15 2 2 34
Deutsche Bank 2 11 7 2 22
UniCredit 12 5 17
Standard Chartered Bank 14   14
ING 82 1 0
BNP Paribas Securities Services 8 1 9
SEB Securities Services 61 7
RZB Group 43 7
Banco Santander 5 2   7
Barclays 7  7
Société Générale 3 2 1 6
Nordea 41 5
Stanbic Bank 5   5
BankBoston 4  4
Hansabank 3 3
Handelsbanken 21 3
Standard Bank 3   3
CSOB 2 2
Fortis Bank  2 2
KAS Bank 2 2
Millenium bcp 2 2
Bank of New York 1 1   2
Nova Ljubljanska Banka 11 2
ANZ 2 2
BBVA Bancomer 2   2
United Overseas Bank 2   2
Westpac 2 2
Banks directly present in more than 
one country
31 27 62 88 23 231
Other banks directly present in more 
than two countries
16 15 14 28 13 86
Total custodian banks 47 42 76 116 36 317
Source: Elaboration of data reported in the Global Custodian magazine’s “2006 Agent Banks in Major and Emerging Markets 
Survey”.
1 THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE 
CUSTODY INDUSTRY
or settles monetary policy operations. Such 
activity falls under local market procedures and 
does not expose the CSD to additional risk.  
A different case exists where CSDs offer 
custody services for foreign securities in 
competition with custodians, providing 
members a single access point to multiple 
markets. Typically, it is not easy for national 
CSDs to succeed in developing a cross-border 
business because market participants generally 
prefer to use specialised full-service providers 
such as global custodians. However, in Europe, 
there are three exceptions to this general 
statement, i.e. the two Eurobond market CSDs, 
and the Swiss national CSD, which have 16
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developed an extensive multiple-market service. 
The Eurobond CSDs can compete with custodian 
banks as intermediaries more effectively than 
national CSDs because they were founded by 
banks and their business model has always 
incorporated banking services. In addition, 
their role as market infrastructures for the 
Eurobond market means that they benefit from 
a unique client base and can cross-sell custody 
and banking services in other securities to the 
same internationally active client base. Their 
clients transact with each other, which allows 
the two ICSDs to base their business model on 
internalisation. In the case of the Swiss national 
CSD, its cross-border custody business is the 
result of a merger with a global custodian, 
Intersettle.
CSDs offer a custody service in securities 
outside their own markets in two ways: the first 
type of arrangement is by appointing a multi-
direct or single-market custodian bank as sub-
custodian. The second type of arrangement is 
by opening an account in other CSDs, which 
may or may not involve the same membership 
rules that apply to market participants. 
Regardless of the legal and operational 
arrangements, the relationship between CSDs, 
whereby one holds the securities of the other, 
is commonly called a “link”. CSDs would 
commonly give each other special services 
conditions not available to regular members. It 
is not uncommon for CSDs in Europe to hold 
securities issued elsewhere on behalf of their 
members. There are various reasons for CSDs 
to start offering this service, acting as a 
settlement agent and custodian. The need could 
arise from foreign securities being listed on the 
stock exchange that results in the CSD being 
required to provide trading members with 
settlement and safekeeping services for those 
foreign securities. Some CSD members may 
want to hold foreign securities pledged to them 
as collateral. Generally, once an investor CSD 
has established an account with an issuer CSD, 
there are no restrictions on the issues of 
securities which its members could hold through 
the arrangement. Most of the national CSDs set 
up links as responses to specific member needs, 
although the two Eurobond ICSDs and SIS have 
Table 4  Links among euro area (I)CSDs eligible to deliver collateral to the Eurosystem in central 
bank credit operations
Country of counterparty posting collateral and investor CSD
Country of 
issuance Issuer CSD
Austria Belgium Finland France
OeKB
Euroclear 
Bank NBB SSS APK
Euroclear 
France
Austria OeKB 1 1
Belgium Euroclear  Bank 1 1 1
Finland APK 1




Frankfurt 1 1 1
Italy Monte Titoli 1 1 1
Luxembourg Clearstream Banking S.A. 1 1 1
Spain Iberclear-SCLV 1
Iberclear-CADE 1
Netherlands Euroclear Nederland 1 1
Total 64328
Source: D. Russo and S. Rosati (2007).17
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Country of counterparty posting collateral and investor CSD






















a strategy of global market coverage, similar to 
that of global custodians. Table 4 provides an 
overview of the eligible links existing among 
the (I)CSDs of nine countries belonging to the 
euro area.18
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2  THE SUPPLY OF CUSTODY SERVICES
2.1 MULTI-TIERED  INTERMEDIATION
Custody, as previously mentioned, is in essence 
the service of holding (and normally 
administering) securities on behalf of others. 
The investment industry is characterised by 
intermediation, and custody reflects this tiered 
structure: securities are ultimately held in their 
national CSD (or the ICSDs in the case of 
Euromarket instruments), but there are usually 
a number of intermediaries between the national 
CSD and the investor. These intermediaries 
include brokers, investment firms, asset 
managers, global custodians, local custodian 
banks, and CSDs that offer cross-border custody 
services. Each layer of intermediary provides 
services that cater to its own customer base and 
that are associated with the assets held under its 
custody.
For example, an individual investor (1) could 
hold its entire portfolio of domestic and foreign 
securities investments with its retail bank or 
broker. The retail bank or the broker (2) buys 
the custody services from its affiliate (3), a 
major custodian bank in its home market. The 
custodian bank holds the home market securities 
in the national CSD, but appoints a global 
custodian (4) as the single service provider for 
all foreign securities. The global custodian 
employs a network of sub-custodians (usually 
about 100) that in turn hold the securities in the 
national CSDs of each foreign market. In 
Europe the chain would generally be more 
limited: the investor would hold securities with 
its retail bank, which holds securities in the 
home market CSD and uses a global custodian 
for foreign securities. It is also very common 
for the investor to use a retail bank as a global 
custodian,: the retail bank would then have a 
sub-custodian network for handling foreign 
securities which in turn holds the securities in 
the respective national CSDs. Other types of 
investors, such as institutional investors and 
investment firms, likewise hold their securities 
via a mixture of intermediaries. A customer’s 
securities that are held with its immediate 
service provider are in turn held at upper-tier 
intermediaries, ending at the market 
infrastructures, the CSDs (where the securities 
are in the first place).11 The total number of 
intermediaries involved between the investor 
and the CSD depends on the business models of 
both the customer and the service suppliers in 
each layer of intermediation.
2.2 MARKET  SIZE
Although there are no official figures on market 
size, it can be roughly expressed in three 
ways: 
–  The value of securities held by custodians,
– Indirectly,12 by the total fee revenues 
custodians receive from safekeeping and 
settlement of securities, and 
–  Indirectly, by the total fee revenues received 
from the full range of services provided by 
custodian banks.
Value of securities held: Due to the multi-tiered 
structure of custody, the size of the market can 
be calculated at different industry layers: for 
example, the same securities held through a 
custody chain would be counted at the global 
custodian level, at the sub-custodian level and 
at the level of the CSD where they were issued. 
To overcome data limitations, we can get an 
idea of market size by looking at the lower 
and upper layer of the industry. The most 
straightforward measure of the size of the 
custody market is thus the value of securities 
issued, making no assumptions about the 
portion of securities directly held by end-
investors (including professional firms holding 
11  As mentioned in Chapter 1, safekeeping by CSDs refers to the 
central deposit of an issue and the provision of the root of title, 
placing CSDs at the highest level of the holding chain, with a 
fiduciary responsibility to maintain at all times the balance of 
the issue and to execute the transfer of securities positions on 
the central register.
12  Total fee revenues provide an indirect measure of the business 
size, as it can be assumed that custodians holding more securities 
collect a larger (total) amount of fees than custodians holding a 
smaller amount/fewer securities. 19
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proprietary positions) which do not require the 
services of a custodian. The value of equity 
securities issued can generally be determined 
by the market value (capitalisation) of 
companies listed on stock exchanges; for fixed 
income and money market securities, it can be 
determined by the nominal value of government 
and corporate issuance outstanding. The total 
value of securities issued can be considered the 
lower bound of the custody market and, globally, 
amounted to just over USD 128,000 billion at 
the end of 2006. Domestic and international 
fixed income securities accounted for USD 
67,150 billion, or 52% of the total (of which 
USD 48,715 billion was domestic and USD 
18,435 billion international); equities accounted 
for USD 50,636 billion or 39%, and money 
market instruments, USD 10,597 billion or a 
bit more than 8%, most of which was domestic 
(see Table 5).
Because of the multiplier effect of the custody 
industry’s tiered intermediation structure, 
where securities are held (and therefore 
counted) at multiple intermediary layers, the 
value of securities held on behalf of others by 
all intermediaries would be larger than the 
value of issued securities. This number would 
constitute the upper bound of the custody 
market. This measure of market size is more 
difficult due to the unavailability of reliable 
statistics. Only a partial picture is possible: the 
value of securities held by the largest global 
custodians, a segment of intermediaries. As 
seen in the previous chapter, this amounted to 
about USD 88,316 billion through 2006 (see 
Table 2). Although this figure does not include 
securities held by other custody service 
providers and intermediaries such as sub-
custodians, brokers, investment firms and asset 
managers, it nevertheless gives an indication of 
the magnitude of the amounts concerned.
Fees from safekeeping and settlement: 
Determining the amount spent on holding 
and settlement of securities by all investors 
and intermediaries is less straightforward. 
Assumptions need to be made regarding the 
level of fees and the multiplier effect of tiered 
holdings. Furthermore, due to keen competition 
among custodians, fees are negotiated with 
individual clients. The level of safekeeping and 
settlement fees could vary widely due to the 
value and mix of services purchased by the 
client. 
Fees from custody services: The definition of 
the custody market could be broadened to 
include the amounts spent on the full range of 
services, including not only safekeeping and 
settlement, but also asset servicing, fund 
administration and banking. Studies that attempt 
to quantify the market size for securities holding 
and the full range of associated services must 
disclose the underlying assumptions for 
ensuring a correct use of the figure. For 
example, if the objective is to measure the 
evolution of post-trade processing expenditure 
and the securities industry’s efficiency over 
time, then the assessment of the market may 
consider including all costs paid by all 
participants for all services, as well as the 
operational costs of firms that have not 
outsourced operations to third-party providers. 
That market size figure may not be appropriate 
for other analytical purposes, e.g. when trying 
to establish the average cost of a cross-border 
transaction to an end-investor. For the latter, 
not only should double-counting of the same 
costs as they pass through multiple intermediaries 
and a few other costs be excluded, but a decision 
would have also to be made regarding how to 
account for providers that charge minimal or no 
safekeeping and settlement fees, but compensate 
with fees for other services. Another example 
where the market size quantification may 
require a different methodology is where a 
service provider wishes to determine its own 
market share. This provider may define market 
size to include only the revenues of its 
competitors in similar services, regarding as 
relevant only the revenues from one layer of 
intermediary and only the range of services that 
this provider offers.
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Table 5 Key indicators of the size of 
securities markets
(end-2006)




  1. NYSE Group 15,421
  2. Tokyo Stock Exchange 4,614
  3. Nasdaq Stock Market  3,865
  4. London Stock Exchange 3,794
 5.  Euronext 3,708
  6. Hong Kong Exchanges 1,715
 7.  TSX  Group 1,701
  8. Deutsche Börse 1,638
  9. BME Spanish Exchanges  1,323
10. SWX Swiss Exchange 1,212
Total, top ten 38,991
All others 11,645
Total, all equity markets 50,636
International debt securities 
(amounts outstanding, by nationality 
of issuer, all countries) 18,435
of which:
Developed countries 15,827
Domestic debt securities 
(amounts outstanding, all issuers 1) 48,715
of which:
Governments 23,613
International money market instruments 
(amounts outstanding) 873
of which: commercial paper 635




Total, all securities 128,383
Sources: World Federation of Exchanges, Annual Report 2006; 
BIS Quarterly Review, March 2007.
1) September 2006. 
2.3 MARKET  STRUCTURE
2.3.1 TRENDS AMONG CUSTODIANS
A technology-intensive industry: The custody 
industry today revolves around processing and 
dissemination of information on customers’ 
securities holdings and transactions, on the one 
hand, and providing liquidity, financing, or 
yield-enhancing solutions on the other. Doing 
both functions well requires large investments 
in information technology.  
Custodian banks must continuously adapt their 
technology because market practice, industry 
standards, legal requirements, fiscal processes 
and infrastructures’ procedures and technology 
are constantly changing. Once the technology 
investment has been made for a capability, 
processing additional volumes usually adds 
limited marginal costs. High fixed costs mean 
that custodian banks require economies of scale 
to be profitable. One means of gaining market 
share is by price competition with other 
custodians, which over time results in lower 
fees throughout the market as existing customers 
also benefit from the lower price levels when 
service contracts are renegotiated. As profit 
margins narrow, there is an increasing need to 
further invest in technology and automate more 
processes in order to remain profitable.
An additional driver for custodians’ information 
technology investments is to remain competitive 
as customers’ securities holdings and activities 
become increasingly diverse and complex. For 
example, institutional investors require not 
only broad geographical coverage but also 
services for increasingly sophisticated 
investment funds and stringent compliance 
measures. Institutional investors and brokerage 
firms alike require more external solutions 
provided by specialists to further reduce their 
own back-office costs.  
Consolidation: During the last decade, not only 
have new entrants to the custody business been 
rare, but a number of single-market and global 
custodian banks have actually exited the 
business. This trend is expected to continue 
worldwide; custodian banks with insufficient 
scale economies will find it increasingly 
difficult to compete.
There are a number of strategies adopted by 
custodian banks to remain viable and 
competitive, depending on the nature of their 
customer base.
Single-market custodians are typically large 
local banks, and in developed countries there 
are usually at least three or four such custodians. 
They have a strong franchise among domestic 
institutional investors that tend to have most of 
their investments in the home market. Because 21
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these clients also have outflow investments to 
other markets, large single-market custodians 
may develop a global custody operation to offer 
a comprehensive service. These custodian 
banks would typically also serve in-house 
affiliates in brokerage, investment banking and 
asset management. The activities from both 
internal and external customers would tend to 
sustain a single-market custodian’s viability, in 
addition to business from major cross-border 
inflow customers. If these custodians’ market 
position with external customers weakens, the 
custodians would need to decide whether to 
continue investing and competing for external 
clients to at least break even on the fixed 
costs, or to exit the custody business and find a 
service provider to support their affiliates’ 
needs. A merger with another bank, however, 
may fundamentally change the business’ 
economics.
The customer base of multi-direct custodians 
usually consists of, as explained previously, 
cross-border market participants which choose 
this service option because they need local 
market expertise and proximity to local market 
infrastructures. Although there are at least two 
or three well-established incumbents in each 
region (Europe, Middle East and Africa, Asia 
and the Americas), some single-region providers 
are diversifying into other regions to gain scale 
economies.  
Global custodians compete in a concentrated 
market segment. In 2005 (see Table 2) the top 
10 global custodians held 77% of the securities 
in this market segment, reflecting consolidation 
which started in the 1990s and is expected to 
continue. The recently announced merger 
between Bank of New York and Mellon is an 
illustration of the high level of concentration in 
the US market, which is dominated by four 
players. In 2005, half of the securities held 
at global custodians were with US providers, 
reflecting mostly the size of their home market 
but also their increasing market share in the 
rest of the world. The largest European global 
custodian is ranked in fifth place. Consolidation 
of the global custody industry in Europe, 
encouraged by conditions created after the 
introduction of the euro and the single passport 
for financial services, and by competitive 
pressure from US providers, is expected to 
continue The same is true of the trend of 
resorting to external providers, which is less 
entrenched than in the US market. Global 
custodians’ strength, besides the ability to 
provide a single access point to as many as 100 
markets or more, lies in fund administration: 
providing geographically diversified portfolios 
a host of information processing, reporting and 
operational services targeted at the specialised 
needs of pension funds, insurance companies, 
collective investment funds and more recently, 
hedge funds. In addition, they provide yield-
enhancing services to their investor client base, 
such as securities lending and tri-party repo 
services. Competition has caused this segment 
of providers to capture new revenues via 
increasingly complex back-office outsourcing 
solutions for institutional investors, the most 
extensive of which involves the takeover of 
entire operations departments, including the 
personnel and technology.
2.3.2 COMPETITION FROM CSDs
Some major market infrastructures are listed 
companies and most CSDs are for-profit 
enterprises. For-profit entities are motivated 
to generate the financial returns expected by 
their shareholders and to which management 
compensation is usually tied.
Competition in banking services: CSDs that 
provide banking services such as liquidity 
provision and securities financing compete with 
custodian banks. These services improve 
settlement efficiency, but in principle they do 
not need to be provided centrally by the CSD. 
However, a CSD may have a competitive 
advantage as providers of such services 
compared with banks. In fact, due to its central 
position in serving the whole market in a given 
financial instrument, a CSD has a privileged 
overview of the whole demand and supply for 
securities lending (e.g. information on total 
market transaction volumes, or on the balances 
of all participants’ accounts in a given security) 
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and, as it also controls the settlement process, it 
therefore has the possibility of seamlessly 
integrating its own securities financing service.
Competition in cross border access: CSDs that 
offer cross-border services for securities not 
deposited with the CSD, providing members 
with a single access point to multiple markets, 
compete with custodian banks. When a market 
participant chooses to access a foreign market 
via its home CSD or via a custodian bank, in 
both cases it is choosing an intermediary to 
access the foreign CSD (the choice depends on 
the needs and preferences of the different 
categories of customers. The demand for 
custody services is analysed in Chapter 3).  
The diversity of CSD services has caused some 
observers to note that the roles of CSDs and 
custodians are blurring and conclude that they 
are increasingly in competition. Competition 
between CSDs and custodians has thus far only 
moved in one direction: CSDs with a banking 
licence are expanding into the commercial 
market of custodian banks and cross-selling 
custody to their membership base, which, 
because it comprises market infrastructures, 
includes all market participants with whom 
they have a long-term relationship. Custodians 
cannot compete with CSDs on their infrastructure 
business. Competition implies the possibility of 
substitution, but given the strong network effect 
that infrastructures enjoy, no custodian or other 
type of institution has yet challenged incumbent 
national CSDs by setting up a rival CSD for the 
same securities, even where allowed by law.
2.3.3 THE EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT
Regulations: In Europe there is a lively debate 
about whether or not CSDs and custodians 
should be allowed to compete in the provision 
of banking services, and under what conditions. 
Those who believe CSDs should be free from 
the constraints of being market infrastructures 
when they compete with custodian banks are of 
the view that either CSDs should not be subject 
to regulations introduced specifically for market 
infrastructures, or that custodian banks should 
be subject to the same. 
However, CSDs attract specific regulation for 
several reasons, in view of their unique notary 
function (which is a public service). 
CSDs’ primary role in the central immobilisation 
of securities, as previously mentioned, is often 
accompanied by a special status and specific 
requirements in national and international 
regulations. The requirements are usually to 
ensure and protect the interests of issuers and 
securities holders and the stability and integrity 
of market infrastructures. In markets where 
entire issues of securities are deposited in the 
CSD, it also has the responsibility to ensure 
that the sum of holdings equals the amount 
issued at all times – a function sometimes 
referred to as the “notary” function. CSDs in 
the European Union that hold collateral for the 
Eurosystem’s credit operations are subject to 
specific requirements, which contain stringent 
conditions that CSDs extending credit to 
members (primarily the ICSDs) must meet.13
Custodian banks, on the other hand, regardless 
of their size, provide custody services subject 
to prudential regulations of banking supervisors 
whose primary focus is on banks’ capital 
adequacy and their management of credit, 
interest rate, liquidity and operational risks.
In a forthcoming contribution, Russo et al. (2007) 
analyse and compare prudential and oversight 
requirements for securities settlement. The authors 
analyse the main relevant regulatory regimes (at 
the international and national EU levels) and 
conclude that proper implementation of banking 
regulation and supervision already covers the 
main credit risk concerns of overseers. 
Another difference between custodian banks 
and CSDs regards relations with their business 
counterparties. Custodian banks provide 
commercial services and compete on service 
and price. They have discretion over the 
institutions they would do business with, the 
services they offer, pricing and contractual 
13  European Central Bank User Standards for Securities Settlement 
Systems. 23
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terms with each customer through individual 
negotiations. CSDs, reflecting their market 
infrastructure status, are expected to offer the 
same conditions regarding participation, fees 
and rules to all participants on a non-
discriminatory basis.
In November 2006, CSDs signed a Code of 
Conduct validated by the European Commission. 
The objective of the Code of Conduct is to 
clarify the terms of competition, particularly 
by isolating the core services of market 
infrastructures. Price transparency, freedom 
of access, interoperability, unbundling and 
accounting separation are the key commitments 
requested by this code. It is too early to evaluate 
the code’s effectiveness as it was only recently 
that the code was introduced and a monitoring 
process established. (The challenges for the 
custody industry possibly deriving from the 
implementation of the Code of Conduct are 
discussed in section 5.2).
CSD and ICSD consolidation 
The most significant development that could 
shape the custody market is a business model 
where one ICSD becomes the single access 
point to multiple national CSDs under ownership 
of the same group. Aside from the immense 
scale economies the merged CSDs would 
generate, the single access point and common 
technology infrastructure would give the ICSD 
the benefit of a customer base that includes the 
members of the national CSDs in all markets in 
its group. Some services in which the ICSD 
competes with custodian banks, such as 
securities lending and borrowing and tri-party 
repo, benefit from network effects. Custodians 
potentially affected by this business model, 
mainly those with an important business in the 
markets controlled by the ICSD groups, advocate 
the separation of banking from infrastructure 
services because they are concerned that de 
facto impediments to competition would arise 
from the ICSD bank’s ability to contact the 
members of all the CSDs in the group, the 
ICSD’s privileged access to information not 
equally available to banking service competitors, 
and insufficient transparency in equivalence of 
access conditions. Other custodians, mainly 
those not directly impacted, do not oppose 
combining an ICSD bank with national CSDs, 
provided the ICSD bank is subject to appropriate 
banking regulations and there are controls to 
prevent abuses. 
The debate surrounding internalisation of 
settlement 
Internalised settlement refers to the situation 
where a custodian bank has two customers 
transacting with each other and the custodian 
transfers the customers’ securities and cash 
holdings on its books without having to forward 
the instructions to the national CSD and 
payment system.14 The conditions which allow 
internalised settlement to occur are so specific 
that its occurrence is usually incidental and 
marginal, even for the largest custodians, and is 
not a substitute for CSD settlement (further 
explanations are provided in Box 1).
In the EU, there has been a great deal of attention 
paid to internalised settlement, which may be 
considered disproportionate in light of its 
incidental nature and irrelevant size. 
Internalisation has been used as the common 
denominator that equates large custodians with 
CSDs to support imposing additional regulations 
on large custodians. This view has been put forth 
by those advocating a “functional” application of 
infrastructure regulations to level the playing-
field between CSDs that offer banking services 
(e.g. the ICSDs) and large custodian banks.
Custodian banks counter that they are already 
adequately supervised as banks, whereas CSDs 
are market infrastructures and should be subject 
to different and more stringent regulations 
because of their systemic importance.
Custodians furthermore reject using internalised 
settlement as the common denominator to 
equate them with CSDs, and believe that much 
confusion has been sown regarding the nature 
and extent of internalised settlement.
14  The more commonly used term for this activity in the custody 
industry is book-entry settlement.
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Box 1
INTERNALISATION OF SETTLEMENT 
Internalisation of trades is fundamentally different from internalisation of settlement. Internalisation 
is a term first used in the context of trade execution. When an investment firm receives buy and sell 
orders from customers and executes the trade on its books without forwarding them to a stock 
exchange, the trade is internalised.  
Trade internalisation not only has the potential for investor abuse, but also poses competition to stock 
exchanges. Settlement internalisation does not give rise to potential for unfair pricing as custodians 
do not have influence over the price of the securities, nor could it be used by custodians to compete 
with CSDs. Using the term internalisation to describe two superficially similar processes with 
significantly different implications is not strictly correct and may be the source of much confusion 
that could have a significant impact on future policy.
Some of the key features of internalised settlement and the common misunderstandings are explained 
below.
Custodians cannot offer internalised settlement as a distinct service. In trading, the investment firm 
in some markets has the discretion to internalise orders or send them through to an organised market.1 
In settlement, custodian banks have no discretion over whether a specific transaction can be 
internalised or not, as its occurrence is coincidental. The client chooses its own trading counterparty 
and a custodian cannot settle the transaction in its books unless the counterparty happens also to be 
a client. Although a custodian may charge a lower fee for an internalised settlement (to pass savings 
in CSD fees on to its client), it is not a specific service that can be offered, let alone guaranteed. 
Equally importantly, the securities positions of the two customers that transact must be in the same 
account at the CSD, an arrangement that cannot be modified opportunistically. Nor could custodians 
net off transactions or otherwise maximise internalised settlement, sending only residual transactions 
to the CSD. Custodians must carry out customers’ instructions exactly, with securities delivered to 
and received from the counterparties as instructed by a client.
Internalised trades result in internalised settlement only if the broker is also the custodian. It is only 
when the investment firm is also the custodian of the buyer and the seller, an arrangement common 
in the retail market, that an internalised trade results in an internalised settlement. An investment 
firm’s institutional customers almost invariably select their own custodians and place orders with a 
variety of investment firms. Each client’s custodian will settle with the investment firm, regardless 
of whether the investment firm internalises the order or not.  
1  As provided for in the European Union’s Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (“MiFID”).
Internalised settlement as a business model is 
realistically feasible only for the ICSDs. The 
ICSDs’ role as market infrastructures for the 
Euromarket means that their customer base 
includes all market participants active also in 
non-Eurobond fixed income markets that 
regularly trade with each other. A high level of 
internalised settlement is a key element of 
the ICSDs’ business model. Controlling the 
settlement flow makes it easier to provide 
banking services that benefit from network 
effects, resulting from a large number of 
counterparties using the same provider, such as 
securities financing and tri-party repo services.25
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3  THE DEMAND FOR CUSTODY SERVICES
3.1 INVESTORS
Retail investors: Retail investors typically use 
the same intermediaries that they use to purchase 
and sell securities as their custodians. Retail 
customers’ needs tend to be more limited 
(compared with those of institutional investors) 
– confirmation of transactions, monthly 
statements, and asset servicing. In Europe, it is 
common for retail investors to keep their 
securities with their retail bank. Over the past 
20 years, in most European markets, retail 
banks have acquired domestic brokerage 
businesses which enable them to offer retail 
clients a one-stop-shop service for trade 
execution and custody services as part of their 
general banking services. The large product 
range offered by retail banks enables them to 
attract clients and to raise exit barriers. For the 
broker, whether it is independent or part of a 
retail bank, offering a custody service to 
customers has multiple benefits: it eliminates 
the costs of transferring securities to and from 
a custodian bank, ties the customer to using its 
brokerage services, and, in cases where the 
broker is allowed to lend money to customers 
to buy securities (directly or via its retail bank 
parent), the securities portfolio can be used as 
collateral for the loans that generate additional 
income from the customer.
Private banking and wealth management 
customers: Custody is usually offered as one 
element in a comprehensive service which 
usually comprises investment advice, brokerage, 
custody, and tax and estate planning advice. 
The exception is “family offices” managing 
very significant assets that tend to use multiple, 
specialised providers.
Corporations: Companies with excess cash 
may invest it in liquid securities that yield more 
than a bank deposit. They usually hold the 
securities with the financial institution they 
purchased them from (bank or investment firm), 
but some do put them with a custodian bank. 
Their specific requirement is usually efficient 
cash management that involves minimum 
opportunity costs.15
Investment firms: These firms, also known as 
investment banks, engage in a variety of 
activities in the securities market. Their trading 
strategy is generally very short term to medium 
term, and they turn around their securities 
portfolio very frequently. To ensure maximum 
flexibility, this client segment generally tries to 
be as close as possible to the market. Typically, 
they either participate directly in a CSD or use 
the services of a multi-direct custodian or 
single-market custodian. One of their specific 
essential needs is liquidity:  the ability to 
conduct their securities activities in the most 
efficient way so as to minimise the need to 
borrow funds, and when they do borrow to have 
access to funds at the lowest cost.  
Investment firms invest or trade in securities 
for their own account, and their liquidity needs 
are catered for by several services provided or 
intermediated by custodians: tri-party repo, 
collateral management, inventory financing, 
strategic securities borrowing and fails 
coverage. In addition, they are heavy users of 
intraday credit extended by their custodian 
banks, a liquidity service that involves payment 
of funds in the morning against receipt of 
securities in anticipation of funds arriving on 
the customers’ account later in the day when 
securities are delivered against payment.
Institutional investors: This is a diverse 
population that custodians typically view as 
consisting of three distinct but similar sectors: 
collective investment funds, pension funds and 
insurance companies.
Institutional investors’ specific focus is return. 
They need services that will increase the yield 
on their securities and cash portfolios. They also 
need information to track and benchmark 
their investment performance. A third, though 
no less important requirement, is compliance 
with regulations designed to protect investors 
15  Some cash-rich corporates may use a custodian’s tri-party repo 
services as a cash lender.
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whose money is entrusted to them. Regulations 
vary by industry segment and jurisdiction, 
but commonly fall into several areas: the 
type of investments allowed, the markets in 
which they can invest, transparency of 
investment performance, proper segregation 
of and accountability for customers’ assets, 
and due diligence in the selection of service 
providers such as brokers and custodians. 
There are usually many regulatory reporting 
requirements.
The key business activity of these investors is 
to maximise the return on investments within 
the confines of regulations in general and their 
investment mandates in particular. Given their 
business model, institutional investors are 
typically an asset-servicing-oriented group. 
They are hence very sensitive to services, 
such as collection of dividends and interest, 
corporate actions and tax processing, as well as 
to consolidated reporting and any type of 
information that analyses their investment 
decisions or those of their asset managers, 
such as performance measurement. Their 
management’s attention is focused on 
investment and returns, and typically they 
prefer to purchase non-investment-related 
services, relying on specialist providers with 
economies of scale. Institutional investors 
generally turn to third-party providers, and 
often to their custodians (typically global 
custodians), for information processing that 
requires heavy investment in technology. In 
some markets and for some institutions, certain 
activities such as compliance monitoring are 
required by regulation to be delegated to a third 
party that might need to be a specialised bank 
or trustee. The size and reputation of the 
custodian is often a major factor in the selection 
process, and some criteria may even be 
mandated by regulations. Institutional investors 
may also choose custodians based on their 
ability to help enhance the return on their 
investment portfolio, via services in securities 
lending, tri-party repo and cash management.
Hedge funds: These are specialised institutional 
investors that purchase custody services 
differently from the rest. Due to their business 
model of high leverage and complex trading 
strategies, hedge funds require a variety of 
services that they typically purchase from 
investment firms. The principal investment 
firm with which the hedge fund does business 
(the prime broker) will provide a custody 
service, usually at no charge. Investment firms 
introduce capital sources to hedge funds, advise 
and execute transactions that hedge the funds’ 
exposures via a variety of techniques, and 
source securities for strategic borrowing that 
supports short sales. An investment firm may 
have significant credit exposure to a hedge fund 
that is collateralised by securities held by the 
fund. Being a hedge fund’s custodian allows an 
investment firm to have a full view of the fund’s 
activities, including deals concluded with other 
investment firms that may affect the fund’s risk 
profile.
While using an investment firm as custodian 
was a common approach that accelerated a 
hedge fund’s time to market, over time some 
hedge funds have changed providers to 
custodian banks. Given their business model, 
hedge funds have service needs similar to 
investment firms, although they are institutional 
investors. 
Some hedge funds do not invest in securities 
but in other hedge funds. Some custodian banks 
have developed information processing and 
reporting requirements that fit these funds of 
funds’ specific needs, which revolve around 
asset valuation and record keeping.
3.2 INTERMEDIARIES  TO  INVESTORS
The custody business as a multi-tiered 
intermediation industry has customers that may 
be investors in one market and intermediaries 
in another. Some customers of custodian 
banks are not securities investors but their 
intermediaries. There are also providers that 
compete in one market and have a supplier-
customer relationship in another.27
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Brokers: When a broker’s retail or institutional 
customers start investing in foreign markets, 
they generally use the brokers in their own 
markets, who speak the same language and are 
in the same time zone, as an intermediary in the 
purchase or sale transaction. The broker will 
relay the order to a broker in the destination 
market, who then executes the order on the 
destination stock exchange. The introducing 
broker needs to set up settlement arrangements 
in the destination market to receive and deliver 
securities between its customer’s custodian and 
the executing broker. The introducing broker 
either becomes a direct but remote member of 
the CSD in the destination market or appoints a 
local custodian bank as its settlement agent. 
When the introducing broker also acts as 
custodian for its own customers for these 
foreign securities, it is more likely to use a local 
custodian bank in the destination market 
because of asset-servicing requirements that 
require local market expertise.
Brokers are often divisions within investment 
firms. An investment firm’s custodian would 
need to provide services that cater to its 
customer’s proprietary trading, brokerage and 
prime brokerage businesses, all with somewhat 
different service needs.
Global custodians: Single-market and multi-
direct custodians act as local custodians (also 
named sub-custodians) for global custodians in 
markets where the latter lack a presence or a 
membership in the CSD. Global custodians use 
local custodians for settlement and asset 
servicing, but they provide fund administration, 
securities lending and tri-party repo services to 
their own customers.
Asset managers: Some institutional investors 
may appoint third-party asset managers to 
manage their investment portfolio. They may 
purchase the custody services for the investment 
portfolio from these asset managers, who in 
turn appoint a custodian, usually a bank. The 
asset manager may be able to provide its 
institutional investor customer with the 
information and reporting services that it needs. 
However, over time, many asset managers 
decide to exit the custody business because the 
information technology investments needed for 
reporting are very substantial and large global 
custodians are able to provide a comprehensive 
service. 
Asset managers, as intermediaries for 
institutional investors, have needs similar to 
those of their clients. They value asset servicing, 
consolidated reporting and fund administration. 
Some custodian banks have developed services 
to facilitate fund distribution for this client 
segment, for example reporting on statistics on 
the origin of subscription to enable the asset 
manager to calculate commissions by fund 
distributor.
Medium to small-sized banks: These 
intermediaries mainly cater to a specific 
segment of investment customers in their home 
market, and some find that it is not cost effective 
to hold exchange memberships or direct 
accounts at CSDs in foreign markets. They 
instead appoint a single broker/bank for trading 
and custody services in multiple markets and 
instruments. A single broker/bank can provide 
the smaller intermediaries with a range of 
ancillary banking services such as financing, 
hedging, foreign exchange trading and cross-
border payments.
Issuers: Corporate issuers use a broad range of 
dedicated services provided by custodian 
banks: 
–  Corporate trust: handling the full range of 
corporate events, from paying agency and 
dividend distribution to centralising capital 
reorganisations such as rights issues, share 
exchange offers, warrant programs and 
buybacks. These services are provided for a 
diversified range of instruments including 
equities, Eurobonds, euro medium-term 
notes (EMTNs), euro commercial paper 
(ECP) and complex, asset-backed issues. 
They include fiscal and principal paying 
agent services, as well as listing agent and 
trustee services in some countries. 
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–  Shareholder services for registered shares: 
shareholder registrar services for issues 
held in registered form. This includes 
tracking the shareholder base, monitoring 
share movements and providing customised 
reports. 
–  Annual General Meeting: handling 
regulatory filings and logistics related to 
shareholders’ convocation, providing 
electronic voting facilities, distributing 
resolutions and voting ballots. 
–  Employee share and stock option plans: 
establishing and managing employee share 
and stock option plans, with beneficiaries 
often spread over multiple markets. This 
includes publishing user documentation, 
providing customised reporting solutions, 
administering beneficiaries’ registers, 
managing the exercise of options and, in 
some cases, financing the purchase of the 
underlying shares.29
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4  RISKS INVOLVED IN CUSTODY
Providing custody services involves risks, but 
custodians’ customers also take risks on their 
service providers. The risks for both parties fall 
into three general categories: operational, 
financial and legal, although the nature of such 
risks and the circumstances in which they arise 
differ between the provider and the user of 
custody services. In the wider context of 
financial market stability, there is also systemic 
risk that can be caused by operational or 
financial failure of a custodian that is a large 
financial institution, but such risks are not 
specific to the provision of custody services. 
Custody services provided by a bank fall under 
the regulation and supervision of banks. There 
are extensive regulatory controls governing 
bank custodians, and in many markets specific 
requirements are imposed on the custody 
arrangements of institutional investors such as 
collective investment schemes, which in turn 
impose compliance requirements on their 
custodian banks. Custody services provided by 
other institutions such as investment firms are 
not necessarily subject to similar regulations. 
As mentioned earlier, CSDs are subject to 
specific regulations, resulting from their central 
market position. 
4.1  RISKS INCURRED BY CUSTODIANS
The risks incurred by custodians may arise in 
the context of their provision of custody 
services, associated with specific activities and 
specific consequences. However, these are the 
same kinds of risks that a bank normally faces, 
manages and mitigates for all banking services. 
Essentially, there are no additional categories 
of risks that are unique to a bank’s custody 
service.
4.1.1 OPERATIONAL RISKS 
Operational risk is the risk of financial loss 
resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people or systems, or from external 
events. It also includes the risk of failure to 
comply with applicable regulations, contractual 
agreements and a firm’s own policies. It is not 
possible to catalogue all types of operational 
risk exhaustively, but below are some common 
examples arising from custody services.
Corporate actions: A corporate action is an 
event initiated by the issuer of a security, giving 
rise to a right in favour of the investor. Regarding 
custody services, the biggest operational risks 
are associated with corporate actions, where the 
entire value of an action could be at stake due 
to operational errors or a lack of follow-up and 
tracking. Missing a deadline for the exercise of 
a right could lead to loss of the value of the 
entire entitlement. Incorrect client account set-
up and maintenance could, for example, lead to 
crediting entries to the wrong accounts, or 
applying incorrect withholding tax on income, 
and could even increase the possibility of fraud. 
Inaccurate interpretation or communication 
of the terms of a corporate action to clients 
could lead to claims for losses. At its simplest, 
an error would result in a readjustment to 
holdings and a compensation for the loss, but 
consequences of an error could also be far more 
complex if the security is held by an investment 
fund and the error has caused a mis-pricing 
of the fund before it was discovered and 
remediated.
Settlement: Most market infrastructures settle 
by delivery versus payment (“DVP”), ensuring 
that an investor always has either securities 
or cash. Therefore, financial losses due to 
operational problems in settlement involve 
mainly the cost of funds for the value not settled 
on time, but not loss of the entire principal 
amount. However, inadequate follow-up, 
inadequate tracking and escalation of failed 
transactions by a custodian could lead to costly 
market-mandated buy-ins for unsettled 
transactions.
Fund accounting and administration: Fund 
accounting services are subject to operational 
errors in the valuation of an investment fund, 
leading to wrong pricing of units investors 
bought or redeemed. Trustee services are 
subject to operational errors that may fail to 
detect a breach of investment guidelines. A 
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custodian responsible for the error will be 
subject to claims from clients.
Risk mitigation techniques and standard 
practices: Operational risks can be mitigated 
via a system of appropriate and stringent 
controls. Custodians identify the operational 
risks involved, put controls in place, and 
continuously evaluate, test and monitor the 
adequacy of such controls. Under Basel II, 
custodian banks will be required to self-assess 
their operational risk exposure and have 
sufficient capital to cover potential losses.
Clients of custodians would be exposed to 
similar operational risks and, in most cases, 
regulatory constraints, if they were to perform 
the same activities themselves in-house. For 
many clients, purchasing back-office corporate 
actions and settlement services from custodians 
has the effect of using custodians’ scale 
economies and expertise to make operational 
errors less likely. 
4.1.2 CREDIT RISKS 
Credit risk is the risk that the client will not be 
able to meet its financial obligation to the 
custodian, for example due to insolvency. Since 
the purchase, sale and holding of securities 
involve payments, custodian banks not only 
process payments but also extend credit and 
provide liquidity to clients. 
A custodian bank may lend money to the client 
for the settlement of securities purchases, or 
may advance money to clients on the due date 
of interest or dividend payments when the 
money has not yet been received from the issuer 
of the securities. A custodian bank may also 
provide intraday liquidity to clients by making 
payment to a client’s counterparties early in the 
day before the expected funds for credit to the 
client’s account arrive later that day. If the funds 
do not arrive as expected, the funds are lent 
overnight to the client by the custodian bank.
Risk mitigation techniques and standard 
practices: Banks are regulated and supervised 
as credit institutions and as such have policies 
and processes in place to control the credit 
quality of clients with whom they enter into 
custody arrangements or conduct other banking 
business. In addition, processes are generally in 
place to identify, for each client, the business 
activities for which the bank would extend 
credit, the extent of the exposure to each type 
of activity, whether credit is to be collateralised 
and the overall exposure limit to the client. 
Such limits would typically be controlled for 
all exposures, including intraday exposure. As 
the limit approaches, escalation procedures 
generally kick in to ensure appropriate risk 
management review and action.
4.1.3 LEGAL RISKS 
Legal risk is commonly defined as the risk of 
a loss of a right resulting from laws and 
regulations being inapplicable or unenforceable 
or other legal circumstances, e.g. inadequate 
laws, inadequate legal documentation. Regarding 
custody, one of the most important and likely 
legal risks among rights in securities surrounds 
the contestability of rights over collateral.16 
The nature of securities services is such that if 
a bank lends on a collateralised basis, the 
collateral is predominantly provided in the form 
of securities.
The risk of inapplicability of the preferred 
choice of laws governing the collateral 
agreement is particularly increased in the cross-
border context, where the conflict between 
national laws is, in general, the major source of 
uncertainty. When a custodian needs to liquidate 
collateral used to secure a loan to a client, if 
the collateral was provided cross-border or the 
underlying securities are multinational, several 
national jurisdictions could be involved, 
affecting the custodian’s right to liquidate the 
collateral, and possibly resulting at least in a 
delay or even complete unenforceability in the 
absence of adequate due diligence (but even in 
case of due diligence, delays may occur as a 
result of inadequate collateral laws).
16  For a comprehensive discussion of legal risk management in 
securities investment and collateral, and about the relevant legal 
issues concerning global custody in general, see Benjamin and 
Yates (2003).31
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In the European Union, these problems were 
addressed with the adoption of the Collateral 
Directive,17 which has introduced a common 
rule for the choice of law and mitigated against 
uncertainty deriving from conflicts between 
laws. However, outside the EU this problem is 
still relevant. Two main aspects need to be 
considered regarding conflicting jurisdictions:
–  It is vital to determine the location of 
securities and collateral. This aspect defines 
in principle the applicable jurisdiction 
which governs issues such as the legal 
requirements to ensure the collateral 
arrangements are perfected and, following 
a default, how the collateral can be 
liquidated. Identifying the location is 
becoming all the more important as, 
following dematerialisation, securities and 
securities interests are mostly made by way 
of book-entries on securities accounts, 
making entries to securities accounts held 
by custodians and by central securities 
depositories proof of ownership.
–  The identification of rules applicable to the 
client’s insolvency is vital. 
Due to such complex legal risks, a blind reliance 
on collateralisation of credit exposure may give 
a false impression of security unless robust 
legal risk management is in place and other 
risks associated with collateral (such as market 
risk and operational risk) are contained.
Risk mitigation techniques and standard 
practices: Much of the mitigation of legal risks 
depends on certainty on and within the 
applicable legal regime as well as the coherence 
between the custodian’s rights and its obligations 
towards clients and central securities 
depositories. This is not within the direct 
control of the custodian. The best mitigation 
approach is robust credit risk management and 
monitoring, and eliminating exposure to 
financially unsound clients in the first place.
On the public policy level, legal risk can be 
mitigated by creating clear and binding rules to 
deal with conflicting laws, or more efficiently 
through common legislation, making the 
enforceability of contracts more reliable. The 
question of achieving common international 
regulation is also being debated, and one needs 
to ensure that the level of legal certainty 
provided by current EU Directives is maintained 
in Europe. 
As mentioned earlier, on a European scale, 
current and recent European legislative 
proposals have improved such insufficiencies. 
The most recent EU initiatives to harmonise 
rules in the clearing and settlement area are 
the Collateral Directive, the Settlement 
Finality Directive18 and the Winding-up of 
Credit Institutions Directive.19 Although 
national transposition may have given rise to 
some diverging interpretations, legal certainty 
has been improved by enforcing common rules 
across the EU based on the location of the 
account. A recent European Commission survey 
on the Settlement Finality Directive confirmed 
that it has operated since 1998 to the amplest 
satisfaction of EU Member States.  
Further international efforts to harmonise this 
area are either in development, such as the draft 
Unidroit Convention, or have already been 
finalised in the image of the Hague Convention.20 
However, the former is in an early development 
stage and intends to address also the markets 
17  Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral arrangements.
18 Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and 
securities settlement systems.
19  European Parliament and Council Directive 2001/24/EC on the 
reorganisation and winding-up of credit institutions.
20 The Hague Securities Convention is an international treaty 
finalised in 2002 by the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law (www.hcch.net). It is intended to establish a 
rule that would apply across the major securities markets of the 
world to determine the law applicable to certain issues in respect 
of the holding, transfer and collateralisation of securities 
credited to a securities account held with an intermediary in an 
international context. According to the Convention, the law 
applicable to the issues covered by the Convention is the law in 
force in the State that the relevant intermediary and the account 
holder have expressly agreed as governing their account 
agreement. The US and Switzerland were the first countries to 
sign the Convention on 5 July 2006 and it is expected that soon 
more countries will follow.
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outside the EU, which could further delay a 
consensus. The latter was completed in 2003 
but has not yet been signed or ratified by any 
state, not least because of the perceived need to 
assess the impacts of these new international 
rules, which are based on the parties’ autonomy 
in choosing the applicable law, and are in 
conflict with an EU harmonised regime based 
on the location of the account.21
4.2  RISKS INCURRED BY CUSTODY CLIENTS
Custodians’ clients are exposed to operational, 
financial and legal risk from their service 
provider. In some jurisdictions, regulations 
require institutional investors such as pension 
funds to exercise due diligence when selecting 
custodians, so as not to subject fund holders 
and final beneficiaries to losses that could be 
caused by an operationally inadequate or 
financially unsound custodian.
Operational, financial and legal risks incurred 
by clients of custody services are incurred in 
other banking services as well. However, the 
following sections will deal with custody-
specific risks.
4.2.1 OPERATIONAL RISKS 
A custodian that has weak operational controls 
and continuity of business arrangements could 
make errors or incur delays in processing 
corporate actions, settlement and fund 
administration that cause financial loss to its 
clients. The custody agreement would normally 
provide for client compensation if the fault is 
the custodian’s, but such provisions generally 
do not cover consequential damage, which 
could be a real and significant financial loss. 
Consequential damages include “opportunity 
costs”, losses incurred due to missed 
hypothetical but likely business opportunities 
that are unsubstantiable.
Risk mitigation techniques and standard 
practices: Before appointing a custodian, an 
institution would normally evaluate its 
operational robustness through requests for 
information and, sometimes, on-site visits to 
the operations centre. The quality of management 
and controls is usually a significant custodian 
selection criterion. The assurance of ongoing 
operational robustness is also essential. Some 
clients require that their custodians have 
third-party standardised control qualifications, 
which are enforced in addition to banking 
supervision.22
4.2.2 FINANCIAL RISKS 
Cash that is deposited by a client with a bank 
enters that bank’s balance sheet and is subject 
to claims from creditors in case of the bank’s 
failure. This is no different for custody clients 
who would have cash accounts with the 
custodian. The exception is when the custodian 
is not a bank; in some jurisdictions non-banking 
providers of custody services, such as 
investment firms, are required to segregate 
client money from their own. The client’s 
money is thus protected from claims of third 
21  The Convention and the EC Directives take a different approach 
to the law applicable for indirectly held securities. Community 
legislation is based on a “location of the account” formula. The 
Convention is based on the law expressed in the relevant 
account agreement. These two approaches are incompatible and, 
consequently, the Directives will have to be changed if the 
Convention is ratified. The Commission made a proposal to sign 
the Convention at the end of 2003, but Member States have so 
far been unable to decide on this proposal. On 23 June 2005, the 
Council asked the Commission to assess four legal issues, 
namely: (1) scope of application, (2) extent of third-party rights, 
(3) consequences for substantive and public law and (4) impact 
of the diversity of laws on settlement systems and prudential 
regimes. The Commission’s legal assessment, issued in the form 
of a staff working paper, concluded that the first three issues 
would not pose major difficulties, but that the application of the 
Convention may affect the financial stability of securities 
settlement systems. Similarly, the European Parliament passed 
a resolution in December 2006 which expressed reservations on 
the agreement and is calling for a proper evaluation of its 
economic and legal effects. The European Parliament also 
restated its commitment to the existing Community legislation 
system. The Council has resumed the debate but remains divided 
on which approach to take. For more information, see http://
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/hague/index_
en.htm
22 One such qualification that is common, particularly among 
US-based clients, is the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants’ Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 70 
(“SAS 70”).  A service organisation, after undergoing a SAS 70 
audit, receives a Service Auditor’s Report as evidence that its 
control objectives and activities, including information 
technology and related processes, have been independently 
audited. Critics of SAS 70 are of the view that that SAS 70 
verifies the existence of controls but not the adequacy or quality 
of the controls.33
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parties in the event the non-bank custodian 
becomes insolvent.
Securities held by a custodian do not enter the 
custodian’s balance sheet, and there are 
generally regulations in place to ensure that 
clients’ securities are not treated as part of the 
custodian’s own property in liquidation 
proceedings in case of the bank’s failure. 
However, clients may encounter delays when 
trying to access their securities and transfer 
them to an alternative provider, which could 
cause liquidity problems or opportunity costs.
Risk mitigation techniques and standard 
practices: A client needs to evaluate the 
financial health of a custodian bank prior to its 
appointment and monitor it during the course 
of the service contract. All cash deposited 
with a bank represents a client’s exposure to 
that bank.
Financial market participants and consumers 
rely on public authorities’ oversight and 
supervision of banks to ensure that banks are 
prudently managed and remain solvent. Clients 
should resist moral hazard where the belief in a 
bank being “too big to fail” might lead them to 
have an imprudent tolerance of financially 
unsound banking practices.
4.2.3 LEGAL RISKS 
The main legal risk for clients of custodian 
banks is the risk of loss of title to securities 
(including shortfalls) held in its account.23 A 
custody agreement is one in which a client 
entrusts securities and the related servicing to a 
custodian. The main legal risk is therefore the 
ability of the client:
1)  to ensure that its rights are protected from 
any unauthorised use by the custodian, as 
well as against third parties or bankruptcy 
of the custodian,
2)  to use or enforce such rights. Most 
jurisdictions provide clients with proprietary 
rights to the securities (rights in rem), while 
other jurisdictions provide clients with a 
claim on the custodian, exposing them to 
the risk of the custodian’s failure. 
Protection of the client is generally achieved 
through the combination of legislative 
provisions, custodian regulatory obligations, 
and contractual obligations. Topics of critical 
importance are:  
–  the protection of the investor in case of 
custodian (or upper-tier) bankruptcy, 
–  the protection of the bona fide acquirer, 
– the avoidance by custodians of any 
(accounting or lack of cover) shortfall,
–  the protection of owners against upper-tier 
attachments,
–  prohibition on using the assets or acting 
without client instruction.
In the context of legal risks associated with the 
use of a custodian’s services, it is important to 
distinguish the risk of enforceability of a 
contract with the custodian as explained above, 
and the risk of enforceability of title due to 
complexities in the legal system. Although this 
latter legal risk cannot be avoided by more 
careful selection of a custodian, it is further 
explained in the paragraphs below because such 
risks could be misinterpreted as custody risk, 
when they are actually risks arising from 
general cross-border securities holding.24
As securities transactions and custody services 
are becoming increasingly international, the 
legal risks resulting from conflict of laws 
and inadequate substantive laws gain more 
importance. A chain of intermediaries in 
23  For a comprehensive review of the law of global custody, see 
Benjamin and Yates (2003).
24 Legal risks related to loss of title to securities in a purely 
domestic context are generally low, as most national markets 
have legislation that recognises the legal rights of investors 
holding securities through intermediaries such as custodians.  In 
this case, the market infrastructure, securities, custodian and 
customer are usually all in the same jurisdiction, and problems 
related to conflict of laws do not arise.
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different jurisdictions could be involved (such 
as asset managers, global custodians and sub-
custodians). Such tiering in a chain of 
international intermediaries, natural to cross-
border custody, makes legal implications 
complex and thus involves additional risks to 
be managed, e.g. if there is a bankruptcy of an 
intermediary or a large client of one of the 
intermediaries in the chain.
Claims by creditors against an insolvent 
intermediary affecting customer’s securities 
could cause repercussions up and down the 
chain of cross-border intermediaries. In a 
bankruptcy scenario, national legal regimes 
may indicate different solutions to the problem, 
which is complicated by diverging rules on 
which legal system applies to the questions 
which arise in non-EU international insolvencies. 
Discrepancies between the custodian’s rights 
and its obligations towards clients and central 
securities depositories could be altered to the 
account holder’s disadvantage, and result in 
problems enforcing the underlying contract or 
pure losses.
Risk mitigation techniques and standard 
practices: Complications arising from 
interaction of national laws in a cross-border 
context that could result in a loss of title to 
assets cannot generally be prevented by an 
individual client, although the latter can take 
basic precautions, such as contractual terms 
that require the custodian to have proper 
segregation of client assets and terms specifying 
the obligations under the law governing 
the bilateral contract between client and 
custodian.
As described above, much of the mitigation of 
legal risks depends on certainty in the 
determination and content of the applicable 
legal regime and is not within the direct control 
of the custodian or its client. Public policy-
makers can help investors mitigate legal risk by 
creating clear and common rules on conflict of 
laws or, more efficiently, through common 
substantive law rules. This is already the case 
in Europe, where certainty is based on the 
location of the account. The question of 
achieving common international regulation is 
also being debated. 
4.2.4 RISKS ARISING IN INTERNALISED 
SETTLEMENT
According to custodians, internalised settlement 
is no more risky than settlement in a CSD. As a 
standard practice, custodians ensure that two 
customers that transact have sufficient securities 
and cash respectively before effecting the 
transfer, thereby ensuring that a customer is not 
exposed to the risk of loss of principal. 
Following this practice, therefore, ensures that 
internalised settlement is no more risky than 
settlement in a CSD regarding protection from 
principal risk. Regarding protection in the event 
of the insolvency of the custodian bank, a 
transaction settled in the CSD would be 
protected in the EU by the Settlement Finality 
Directive from being unwound. Although it 
would appear that settlement in the CSD in 
this scenario is protected from the risk that 
a liquidator applies for the transaction to be 
unwound, internalised settlement does not in 
fact change the exposure of each customer’s 
cash deposits to its chosen custodian bank’s 
insolvency. Unwinding a book-entry transaction 
would only have the effect of changing the 
customer who holds (and therefore loses) the 
cash from the seller to the buyer. Given that 
internalised settlement is rare, such an event 
would not have systemic consequences, and 
therefore a general protection against 
unwinding, like the one given to settlement in 
the books of a CSD, is not necessary.
4.3 SYSTEMIC  RISK
The operational outage or financial failure of 
an institution could negatively impact the 
functioning of the financial system as a whole 
if the institution’s failure affects the ability of 
other institutions to meet their obligations. 
Systemic risk is defined as when one institution’s 
inability to meet its obligation makes other 
institutions unable to meet their obligations, 
resulting in significant liquidity and credit 
problems that threaten the stability of or 35
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confidence in markets. Several scenarios could 
cause such an effect, which is commonly 
referred to as contagion, or a knock-on or 
domino effect. Systemic risk is not confined to 
the custody business area of a bank, but applies 
to all banking activities. Banks are not the only 
financial institutions that could give rise to 
systemic risks. Other financial institutions, 
such as investment firms, could likewise be 
systemically important. Securities and other 
wholesale market infrastructures are, by 
definition, systemically important.
4.3.1 OPERATIONAL FAILURE OF A CUSTODIAN
Large-scale technical failure in data processing 
or a physical impediment to employees being 
able to perform their normal functions could 
stop a bank from processing clients’ instructions 
to make cash payments and receive or deliver 
securities. Regulation cannot completely 
remove operational failure or prevent disruptive 
events; preparedness for localised and 
widespread disruptions is the key to avoiding 
unmanaged strains on the financial system.
If a bank is unable to pay cash due to operational 
problems, not only at its securities business but 
also for all payments, its clients could experience 
liquidity problems. The inability of a custodian 
to effect deliveries and receipts of securities 
could likewise impact the liquidity of their 
clients’ market counterparties, which expect to 
receive cash proceeds or securities that are 
needed for onward delivery to others in 
exchange for cash.
Risk mitigation techniques and standard 
practices: Institutional clients that prudently 
manage their credit and liquidity needs would 
normally have more than one banking and 
liquidity service provider, which would mitigate 
the negative impact of one provider’s operational 
outage.
The systemic impact from an operational outage 
of a large, otherwise healthy institution would 
be minimised if market participants, the central 
bank and regulators intervened and took 
appropriate measures to inject liquidity 
temporarily into the financial system. There is 
a recent example which illustrates the success 
of such measures, even in a major widespread 
operational disruption: the outage on September 
11, 2001 of many brokers and one of the two 
major custodian banks for US government 
securities.
In this well-known case, all stakeholders 
involved took measures to inject liquidity in an 
appropriate and highly controlled environment 
to stabilise the situation. It proved that even 
a large-scale operational failure does not 
necessarily result in the failure of the financial 
system. The prime prerequisite for preventing 
systemic disruption is participants’ trust in the 
financial soundness of their counterparties. The 
common support by the public authorities and 
all members of the financial community is 
essential to preserving liquidity.
Nevertheless, although these concerns are 
largely addressed by banking regulations, 
overseers have started to consider the 
operational relevance of key participants in the 
payment systems when considering financial 
market infrastructures’ business continuity 
arrangements. For instance, subsequent to the 
events of September 11, US market authorities 
imposed regulatory requirements for robust 
business continuity arrangements but applied 
them proportionately, differentiating between 
infrastructures and large participants in the 
financial markets. Regulators focused 
particularly on large brokers responsible for a 
large trading activity on an organised market.25  
Nevertheless, regulators cannot simply mimic 
the US’s approach and criteria in Europe 
25 The Interagency paper on Sound Practices to strengthen the 
resilience of the US financial system is available at http://www.
sec.gov/news/studies/34-47638.htm. The paper defines the 
“firms that play significant roles in critical financial markets” 
as “those that participate (on behalf of themselves or their 
customers) with sufficient market share in one or more critical 
financial markets such that their failure to settle their own or 
their customers’ material pending transactions by the end of the 
business day could present systemic risk”. While recognising 
that there are different ways to gauge the significance of such 
firms in critical markets, as a guideline, the US agencies 
consider a firm significant in a particular critical market if it 
consistently clears and settles at least 5% of the value of 
transactions in that critical market.
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26  See paragraph 2.5 of ECB (2006): “At a minimum, relevant 
participants should also be able to close one business day and 
reopen the following business day on the secondary site”.
27  While banking supervisors focus mainly on capital adequacy 
(even in the context of operational risks, prudential banking 
regulation is ultimately linked to capital adequacy, and in the 
Basel II operational risk assessment), overseers of market 
infrastructures focus on business continuity arrangements in 
view of operational risks and their impact on the wider financial 
markets. See also Russo et al. (2007).
because the market is not the same size and it is 
organised differently. It is also worth noting 
that European banking participants are already 
de facto largely subject to similar requirements 
under both the new MiFID and Capital 
Requirements Directives. In particular, Article 
13 of the MiFID requires investment firms to 
take all reasonable steps to ensure continuity 
and regularity in the performance of their 
activities. For that purpose, they have to employ 
appropriate and proportionate resources, 
systems and procedures. As far as banks are 
concerned, Article 4 (22) of the Capital 
Requirements Directive recognises inadequate 
or failed internal processes as a source of 
operational risk. Furthermore, according to 
Annex V, No 9, 13: “Contingency and business 
continuity plans shall be in place (…).” (Russo 
et al., 2007). In Europe, when adopting 
the recent “Business continuity oversight 
expectations for systemically important 
payment systems (SIPS)”, the Eurosystem also 
explicitly acknowledged that the technical 
failure of critical participants in the system 
may induce systemic risk, and included a 
recommendation that “participants which are 
identified as critical by SIPS operators 
should also have a secondary processing site. 
This should be part of the technical requirement 
to access the system.”26 These oversight 
expectations refer to payment systems, but in 
principle a similar recommendation could be 
adopted for the securities clearing and settlement 
systems (and their critical participants). 
4.3.2 FINANCIAL FAILURE OF A CUSTODIAN
The deterioration in the financial condition of a 
bank, unlike an operational disruption, is 
usually not sudden. Prudential supervision by 
public authorities and minimum capital 
requirements serve to ensure that banks remain 
liquid and solvent. Usually, financial difficulties 
do not emerge without warning and an orderly 
arrangement for the liquidity needs of an ailing 
bank could be expected to be in place.
An inability to make payments for securities 
transactions due to a bank’s financial situation 
could, like operational problems that prevent 
the processing of payments, cause liquidity 
problems among its clients.
However, if a custodian bank was not able to 
meet its payment obligations for the settlement 
of securities, it would imply that the bank would 
not be able to meet other payment obligations 
as well. The systemic impact of the overall 
failure of an institution therefore depends on its 
size and the total value of its payment 
obligations, not only payments related to its 
custody activities.
Risk mitigation techniques and standard 
practices: Banks’ financial health is extensively 
regulated and internal monitoring procedures 
make sure that institutions comply accurately 
with regulations so as to avoid any default. 
Banking supervisors closely monitor the 
financial soundness of credit institutions and 
take appropriate measures if a bank’s financial 
health displays symptoms of possible failure.27
It has been suggested that one potential way to 
limit the systemic effects in the securities 
market of a custodian bank’s financial failure, 
which could be caused by losses in an area of 
business unrelated to custody, would be to ring-
fence its custody business into a separate 
subsidiary. The counterargument is that size 
and diversification of services contribute to a 
bank’s stability and liquidity. All things being 
equal, customers holding cash accounts would 
much rather be exposed to a large diversified 
financial institution than one with much less 
capital. Furthermore, there are no clear limits to 
the ring-fencing approach, which eventually 
could result in the separation of all business 
lines and the destruction of the universal bank 
business model common in many countries.37
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5 CHALLENGES  FOR  THE  CUSTODY  INDUSTRY
Future demand for custody services can be 
expected to increase in line with the expansion 
of capital markets. Growth in both securities 
issuance and trading volumes, the increasing 
use of privately funded pension plans that 
invest in securities, and the growth of investment 
portfolios in the Middle East, Russia, China 
and other new economies are compelling drivers 
for growth in securities under custody. The 
range of services offered by custodians can be 
expected to follow the requirements of clients, 
particularly in the fund services arena. There 
are, however, a few key challenges to custodians’ 
ability to maintain growth and profitability.
5.1  DIVERSITY AND INCREASING COMPLEXITY 
OF ASSETS
The major forces that are most likely to shape 
the custody industry in the years to come 
include the continued globalisation of the 
financial markets, leading to changes in the 
investment patterns of institutional investors 
and increased demand for global liquidity 
management solutions. The competition for 
superior investment returns and the increasing 
allocation of institutional investment portfolios 
to alternative investments – e.g. derivatives, 
hedge funds, commodities – will require 
custodians to develop a variety of new and 
specialised services for these alternatives. The 
different providers in the custody industry will 
be impacted in different ways. Because of keen 
competition that has resulted in progressively 
lower price levels, custodians of all types are 
faced with the challenge of revenue compression 
concurrent with a need to invest.
Global custodians: One major challenge facing 
global custodians is how to keep up with their 
institutional investor clients’ wider choice of 
investment assets and the associated specialised 
service requirements. Financial market 
innovations and globalisation increase the 
variety and often the complexity of financial 
instruments that institutional investors choose 
to buy. Derivatives and hedge funds, for 
example, have become relatively common in 
institutionally managed portfolios.
Global custodians need to invest not only in 
technology to process and report on these new 
asset types, they also need to implement 
additional operational risk controls. A large 
global custodian might typically spend several 
hundred million euros a year on information 
technology. A global custodian needs to make 
efficient technology investments so it can reap 
first-mover benefits from new value added 
services. Unless the first-mover advantage is 
sufficiently sustainable, however, competition 
could erode the premium pricing before the 
investments yield a significant return. Followers 
need to invest in technology in order to stay 
competitive and stay in business. Price 
competition is keen because scale economies 
are important in an industry characterised by 
high fixed technology costs and relatively low 
marginal costs for servicing incremental 
business volumes.
In the United States, the need for consistently 
high investment volumes and economies of 
scale has led to consolidation in the global 
custodian industry. As a result, there are a 
relatively stable and small number of large 
global custodians and a number of smaller ones 
with niche specialisations. Niche providers 
are characterised by premium-priced, value 
added services provided to a specific customer 
segment, or by an ability to offer more flexible 
and customised services that large custodians 
find more difficult to deliver. Even so, mergers 
and acquisitions are still ongoing. Two of 
the largest US global custodians, The Bank of 
New York and State Street, recently announced 
combinations with medium-sized firms, Mellon 
Group and Investors Financial Services 
Corporation respectively.
In Europe, the global custody business is 
organised differently than in the United States, 
and is in particular characterised by less 
specialisation. Indeed, a large portion of this 
business is still embedded in non-specific 
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European global custodians are likely to face 
increasing competition from their US 
equivalents. The US market is mature and US 
providers are counting on the European market 
to ensure their future development. In all 
regions, global custodians leverage their 
domestic franchise to develop their business. 
But US competitors are able to leverage a very 
large domestic base and benefit from scale 
economies to fund technology developments 
necessary in an ever-demanding market. Some 
European custodians remain focused on 
servicing their internal business, while others 
develop a European and even global business 
independently or through acquisitions. Some 
other custodians have forged partnerships with 
US global custodians, acting as the sales agent 
in their home markets, while the US partner 
provides the needed technology. As Europe 
gradually consolidates, competition will 
crystallise around the key players. 
Multi-direct and single-market custodians: 
This layer of intermediaries specialises in 
national securities markets. They are 
nevertheless affected by the diversity of 
investment activities and increasing complexity 
of assets in three ways:
Global custodians, which have cost pressure 
from the substantial amounts they must invest 
in technology to cope with complexity, tend to 
negotiate hard with sub-custodians to reduce 
fees. Intense competition among multi-direct 
and single-market custodians gives clients 
significant power to negotiate lower fees and 
better services.  
Brokers and investment banks need liquidity 
and financing solutions from their custodians. 
The globalisation of investment flows requires 
that assets are financed in different markets 
and regions. These clients demand more 
sophisticated capabilities in securities financing, 
collateral management, foreign exchange and 
cross-currency cash management. The multi-
direct and single-market custodian may need to 
offer a comprehensive solution that extends 
beyond its geographical coverage.
Single-market custodians have the specific 
challenge of competing with multi-direct 
custodians on both service and cost, but with 
significantly less economies of scale or scope. 
Banking mergers may help some single-market 
custodians acquire scale.
5.2  COMPETITION FROM CSDs IN BANKING 
SERVICES
Some CSDs, in particular those with banking 
licences, compete with custodian banks in 
services that involve credit risk taking, such as 
liquidity provision for settlement, securities 
financing and collateral management. A CSD 
that has control over the settlement process for 
an entire market is in a unique position to 
integrate core infrastructure services and 
banking services seamlessly, even on the same 
processing platform. Custodian banks would 
find it difficult to match the economies of scale 
of a market infrastructure (even more difficult 
if it is a multi-market infrastructure), and could 
not match the efficiency level of market 
infrastructures, especially if the value added 
services are run on the CSD’s platform, as none 
of them would have a client base that includes 
all participants in the market. Services such as 
securities financing and collateral management 
benefit from the network effects of a CSD, 
whose clients include both investors with 
assets and brokers who need to borrow them. 
CSDs that offer securities financing services 
can disintermediate banks as the ease and 
convenience of bundled core settlement and 
securities financing services are especially 
attractive to investment banks which are 
heavy users of these services. This could 
lead ultimately to a reduction of choice and 
bargaining power of other categories of users, 
to their detriment. Giving custodians equal 
access to compete effectively in the provision 
of banking services could help lower the cost 
to market participants and increase their 
negotiating power for better service. Indeed, 
keen competition at the intermediary level is 
the mechanism by which reductions in running 
costs are passed through to the users. However, 
another scenario is for more CSDs to become 39
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banks in order to generate additional revenue 
and profits. The implication of this generalised 
change in the CSD business model in terms of 
efficiency, stability and benefits for the users 
would however need to be carefully analysed. 
Custodian banks are generally not subject to 
this type of disintermediation threat in markets 
where the authorities prohibit or restrict CSDs 
from undertaking activities that involve credit 
risk taking. The prudential measures are not 
intended to prevent competition from CSDs; 
their main objective is to prevent market 
infrastructures from taking risks not essential 
to their functions. There is potentially moral 
hazard associated with a market infrastructure 
bank being considered too important to fail. 
Market participants may tend to be less prudent 
regarding the level and concentration of their 
risks to the market infrastructure because of an 
expectation that the central bank would be a 
lender of last resort in order to prevent a 
collapse of the market infrastructure, to preserve 
the notary function performed by the CSD, and 
to avoid systemic meltdown.
5.3  EUROPEAN CHALLENGES (MIFID, CODE OF 
CONDUCT AND TARGET2-SECURITIES)
Custodians active in the EU face an additional 
and specific challenge: Three public authorities’ 
initiatives in the EU may redesign significantly 
the European custody landscape. 
MiFID: The Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID) gives market participants 
the right to designate a system (CSD) to settle 
their transactions, wherever traded in the EU. 
Implementing this regulation would mean that 
CSDs could accept as members trading firms 
that are not a resident in their national market. 
The ability of EU market participants to obtain 
remote membership of and access to CSDs, the 
consolidation of CSDs and market practice 
harmonisation, are expected to lead to a 
reduction of the cost of direct CSD access. This 
makes it more vital for custodians to have 
economies of scale and scope to offer an 
attractive economic proposition and value 
added services. Clients would still be comparing 
the cost of direct access versus using a custodian. 
Even if custodians could still compete through 
economies of scale compared with individual 
clients’ back offices, the margins would be 
thinner because the cost base would be much 
lower. Such developments in the EU may serve 
to accelerate the pace of consolidation of 
custody service providers and the trend towards 
resorting to external providers.
MiFID also means that Member States need to 
remove impediments to CSDs’ ability to hold 
and process the securities of another CSD in the 
capacity of intermediary. 
Public authorities have encouraged CSDs to 
compete with each other in the provision of 
cross-border services, with the intention of 
driving down the cost of cross-border settlement 
as one of the means of achieving a single, 
integrated capital market. This service was 
nevertheless mostly only offered for foreign 
securities with a secondary listing on that 
CSD’s national exchange, and competition 
between CSDs has so far not materialised. 
CSDs offering cross-border services act as 
intermediaries for their membership to access 
other CSDs.  
Code of Conduct: Following an initiative of the 
European Commission, a Code of Conduct for 
securities market infrastructures in the 27 EU 
Member States was adopted in late 2006. The 
Code of Conduct requires CSDs to grant 
each other access, so the members of one 
CSD could use it as an intermediary to hold 
the securities issued in another CSD. It also 
allows infrastructures to offer discounts on 
infrastructure and banking services provided as 
a bundle. The market infrastructures’ inadequate 
implementation of the Code may lead to 
unintended consequences. If CSDs extend to 
each other’s services, terms and conditions that 
are superior or privileged compared with those 
available to custodian banks, the custodians 
might find it difficult to compete with CSDs as 
intermediaries. While the Code may succeed in 
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to compete with each other as intermediaries, it 
might also encourage them to leverage their 
dominant infrastructure status to compete with 
custodians in the provision of banking services. 
Custodians would consider it important that 
there be no undue discrimination between 
members that are CSDs and other categories of 
members in terms of access conditions, timing 
and content of information provided, sequence 
of processing, etc. It is also important that 
accounting separation be properly enforced to 
avoid the cross-subsidisation that is harmful to 
maintaining competition for the benefit of 
market participants.
TARGET2-Securities: The Eurosystem proposed 
introducing a shared processing platform for 
the settlement of securities denominated in euro 
and potentially other currencies: TARGET2-
Securities (T2S). T2S could increase efficiency 
for custodians as the harmonisation of many 
aspects of market practices will be accelerated 
and communication interfaces would be much 
simplified. CSDs that participate in TARGET2-
Securities would be able to offer their members 
a single-point-of-entry service to settle 
securities held in any other CSD connected to 
T2S and pay the same low fee. This feature, 
while attractive from an operational efficiency 
perspective, may challenge custodians in at 
least two ways. The first challenge is 
disintermediation. If market participants could 
access multiple markets via membership in one 
CSD, it would increase the probability that 
custodians without sufficient scale economies 
or value added services would lose clients that 
opt for this alternative. Although these market 
participants would need to develop additional 
back-office capabilities to fully replace the 
service they obtained from the custodians, the 
benefit of this investment would be spread over 
all their activities within the euro area. 
Custodians would need to continue to innovate 
in value added services to retain existing 
clients.  
The second challenge is increasing competition 
in banking services. Although the design of 
T2S is still in its preliminary stage, it may be 
possible that a CSD providing a single point of 
entry to settlement on the T2S platform, in 
order to gain market share as an intermediary 
and compete with CSDs that already hold a 
banking licence, may have an incentive to 
provide also banking and credit risk taking 
services to increase revenues. Depending on 
their jurisdiction, the probable consequence 
would be that they would also apply for a 
banking licence or exert pressure on national 
regulators to be allowed to extend credit to their 
participants. Custodians may then face more 
competition from these additional CSDs which 
were to start offering banking services. On the 
other hand, it will require significant investments 
for CSDs to develop those global custodian 
services, and their users may not want to 
finance them when competitive solutions 
already exist with a custodian in a highly 
competitive environment. In addition, as 
explained previously, the evolution of CSDs 
towards credit risk taking activities raises risk 
concerns and could be detrimental to the safety 
of T2S and the financial market. 41
ECB 
Occasional Paper No 68
August 2007
6 CONCLUSIONS 
From its origins in physical safekeeping of 
share certificates, custody has been transformed 
into a technology-intensive information-
processing business. The value of securities 
issued amounts to over USD 100,000 billion 
worldwide. The growth of cross-border 
investments and collective investment schemes 
has created opportunities for custodians to 
specialise.
A number of custodians compete in each market 
segment to deliver services to an array of 
investors with specific service needs. Once the 
securities are in a service provider’s custody, 
the latter has the opportunity to provide related 
services, e.g. liquidity services for trading firms 
that require financing and yield-enhancing 
services for investors. Geographically diverse, 
multi-currency securities portfolios have also 
given rise to specialised reporting services, 
which are most conveniently provided by the 
custodian, which has an overview of the 
holdings and transactions in the portfolio.
Central securities depositories have been 
established in almost all markets to immobilise 
or dematerialise physical securities and to 
enable their transfer by book entry. Market 
participants which have the ability to hold 
securities directly in a CSD may choose to buy 
the services from a custodian, which has 
economies of scale and can process transactions 
and provide asset servicing at a cost lower than 
the market participant itself. The same service 
arrangement is sought by asset managers, who 
choose to specialise in investment rather than 
the operational administration of the funds that 
they manage. Custody is essentially a specialised 
operational service, and there are economies of 
scope which make it efficient to combine it 
with the provision of banking services (which, 
in turn, are backed by the custodian’s balance 
sheet).
The industry’s transformation into a technology-
intensive business means that economies of 
scale and scope are very important for a 
provider’s ability to compete. Industry 
consolidation has started and is expected to 
continue. Custodians face competition not only 
from each other, but also from market 
infrastructures that are expanding in global 
custody and banking services. Custodians are 
calling for the proper separation of market 
infrastructures’ commercial activities, while 
the CSDs are arguing in favour of freedom from 
specific regulations or, alternatively, of 
encumbering custodian banks with the same 
regulations applicable to the CSDs’ central 
utility functions. There is a risk that the debate 
about competition may unduly interfere with 
the regulatory debate about systemic risk 
issues.
Risks are incurred by both the providers and the 
users of custody services. Risks related to 
custody can be classified into operational, 
financial or legal risks. Essentially, there are no 
additional categories of risks associated with 
custody that are unique to a bank’s business 
activities. Custody services offered by banks 
are under the supervision of banking authorities, 
which focus on financial risk management, 
capital adequacy and operational risk mitigation. 
A large financial institution could cause 
systemic risk whether it is a custodian or not, 
and an institution offering custody services 
does not pose per se more risks to financial 
system stability than one that does not (rather, 
systemic implications would depend on an 
institution’s size and the total value of the 
unsettled payment obligations). The use of 
prudential operational management practices, 
combined with regulatory requirements 
regarding business continuity arrangements, 
mitigate systemic risk.
The continued globalisation of capital markets 
will encourage cross-border investment flows 
and the inclusion of diverse types of assets in 
professionally managed securities portfolios. 
While clients’ service requirements increase, 
the pressure for custodians to reduce costs also 
increases due to competition. This is likely to 
lead to further consolidation in the industry.
6 CONCLUSIONS42
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Custody has developed from physical 
safekeeping into an information provision 
industry that is quite complex. It is characterised 
by dominant market infrastructures and multi-
tiered intermediation. Cross-border transactions 
and holdings involve legal risks that are still 
being addressed. However, the interest in 
securities investments and the demand for 
custody services are expected to continue to 
grow. At the same time, costs are expected to 
fall as a result of more efficient market 
infrastructures and competition among 
intermediaries.44
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ANNEX 1
Custodian banks in the EU 







€€ €€€ €€ € €€€€ €
 1 Banca  Intesa            ×          
 2 Banco Espirito 
Santo
                 ×   ×
 3 Banco  Santander                  ×   ×
 4 Bancpost                   
 5 Bank Austria 
Creditanstalt ×
                   
 6 Bank  BPH                       
 7 Bank of Ireland 
Securities Services
        
×
        
 8 Bank of New York                        
 9 Bank Polska Kasa 
Opieki
                      
10 BBVA                      ×
11 BHF-Bank  AG         ×              
12 BNP Paribas ×   × × ×   × × ×   ×
13 BRE  Bank                       
14 Bulgarian 
Postbank
                      
15 Ceska  Sporitelna                       
16 Citigroup × × × × × × × × × ×
17 Commerzbank         ×              
18 Credit Agricole 
Investor Services
   
×
               
19 CSOB                       
20 Cyprus Popular 
Bank
                      
21 Danske  Bank                       
22 Deutsche Bank       ×     ×   ×     ×
23 Dexia  BIL                    ×
24 EFG  Eurobank           ×            
25 Erste  Bank ×                      
26 Fortis Bank    ×             ×      
27 Handelsbanken     ×                  
28 Hansabank                       
29 Hellenic  Bank                      
30 HSBC                      
31 ING   ×             ×      
32 IXIS  Urquijo                      ×
33 KAS Bank           ×      
34 KBC   ×                    
35 Kereskedelmi es 
Hitelbank Rt
                      
36 Kemercni  Bank                       
37 Kredietbank 
Luxembourg
            
×
     
38 Millenium  bcp                  ×    
39 National Bank of 
Greece S.A.
      
×
           
40 Nova Ljubljanska 
Banka
                 
×
 
41 Nordea     ×                  
42 Raiffeisen 
Zentralbank ×
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Custodian banks in the EU (cont’d) 







€ € € € € € €€€ € € € €




              
44 SKB  Banka                 ×  
45 Slovenska 
Sporitelna
                 
46 Société  Genéralé       ×   ×            




country 4 5 3 4 6 6 2 5 1 6 5 4 7
Notes: The information is based on the Global Custodian magazine’s “2006 Agent Banks in Major and Emerging Markets Survey”. The survey is 
based on nearly 10,000 responses worldwide. A custodian must secure a minimum number of responses from institutional clients in each market in 
order to be listed in the survey. Some custodians which specialise in certain market segments, such as retail consumers, do not participate in this 
survey. Only surveyed markets are included in this chart, although there are other markets (usually small) with stock exchanges and custodians. 
€ Countries highlighted in the shaded area have adopted the euro. 
1)At the time of the survey, Bulgaria and Romania were not part of the EU, but they joined on 1 January 2007.47
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ANNEXES





Croatia Iceland Kazakhstan Norway Russia Serbia
Montenegro
Switzerland Turkey Ukraine Total
presence
 1 Arion Custody 
Service ×
          
1
 2 BNP  Paribas           ×     1
 3 Citigroup      ×  × ×  3
 4 Credit  Suisse             ×     1
 5 Deutsche  Bank     × ×   2
 6 DnB  NOR      ×         1
 7 Garanti  Bankasi              ×   1
 8 Handelsbanken      ×         1
 9 HSBC    ×        ×  2
10 ING       ×      × 2
11 Islandsbanki ×            1
12 JSC  Bank  VTB         ×        1
13 Kaskommertzbank      ×         1
14 Landsbanki ×            1
15 Nordea      ×         1




          
1
17 OJSC Universal 
Bank
       
×1
18 Privredna Banka 
Zagreb ×
          
1
19 RZB Group ×     × ×     3




       
1
21 SIS SegaInterSettle           ×     1
22 Société Générale ×             1
23 Turkyie Is Bankasi           ×   1
24 UBS           ×   1
25 Unicredit × ×    × ×   × 5
 
Total custodian 
banks per country 1 5 3 2 4 6 2 5 5 3 36
Notes: The information is based on the Global Custodian magazine’s “2006 Agent Banks in Major and Emerging Markets Survey”. The 
survey is based on nearly 10,000 responses worldwide. A custodian must secure a minimum number of responses from institutional 
clients in each market in order to be listed in the survey. Some custodians which specialise in certain market segments, such as retail 
consumers, do not participate in this survey. Only surveyed markets are included in this chart, although there are other markets (usually 
small) with stock exchanges and custodians.
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ANNEX 3
Custodian banks in Asia Pacific
Countries
Custodian banks
Australia Bangladesh China Hong Kong India Indonesia Japan Korea
 1 ANZ ×          
 2 Bangkok Bank                
 3 Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi             ×  
 4 China Construction Bank     ×          
 5 Citigroup ×  × × × × × ×
 6 DBS              
 7 Deutsche Bank       × × ×   ×
 8 Hana Bank ×
 9 HSBC × × × × × × ×
10 Industrial Commercial Bank 
China ×
        
11 Kasikornbank         
12 Kaskommertzbank             
13 Kookmin Bank               ×
14 Korea Exchange Bank               ×
15 Maybank               
16 Mizuho            ×  
17 National Australia Bank ×            
18 Standard Chartered Bank × × × × × × ×
19 Sumitomo Mitsui Banking             ×  
20 TMB Bank                
21 United Overseas Bank                
22 Westpac ×          
 
Total custodian banks 
per country 5 1 5 4 4 4 6 7
Notes: The information is based on the Global Custodian magazine’s “2006 Agent Banks in Major and Emerging Markets Survey”. The survey is 
based on nearly 10,000 responses worldwide. A custodian must secure a minimum number of responses from institutional clients in each market in 
order to be listed in the survey. Some custodians which specialise in certain market segments, such as retail consumers, do not participate in this 
survey. Only surveyed markets are included in this chart, although there are other markets (usually small) with stock exchanges and custodians.51
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Malaysia New Zealand Pakistan Philippines Singapore Sri Lanka Taiwan Thailand Vietnam Total 
presence
 ×      2  1
       × 1 2
          1  3
             1  4
××××× × × × × 1 6  5
    ×       1 6
×× × × × × × 1 1  7
1  8
×× ×× × × × × 1 5  9
             
1
10
    × 111
            0 12
            1 13
            1 14
×         1 15
             1 16
             1 17
×× × × × × × 1 4 18
             1 19
          × 120
×  ×        2 21
×          2 22
64346 4 4 6 3 7 6  52
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ANNEX 4




Bahrain Botswana Egypt Ghana Israel Ivory Coast Jordan Kenya Kuwait Lebanon Mauritius
 1 Arab Bank ×     
 2 Absa Investor 
Services
        
 3 Amen Bank         
 4 Attijariwafa Bank         
 5 Banque de Tunisie         
 6 Bank Hapoalim ×          
 7 Bank Leumi le-Israel ×
 8 Banque Internationale 
Arabe Tunisie
             
 9 Banque Marocaine 
(BMCI)
 
10 Banque Maroc 
Commerciale du Ext.
11 Barclays   ×  ×      × ×





        
14 FNB International 
Banking
                
15 HSBC ×  ×      ×   × × ×
16 Israeli Discount Bank   ×  
17 National Bank of 
Egypt ×
      
18 Nedbank               
19 Société  Générale     ×         
20 Stanbic  Bank   ×  ×      ×  
21 Standard  Bank              
22 United  Mizrahi  Bank      ×       
 
Total custodian banks 
per country 1 2 4 2 5 1 2 2 1 1 2
Notes: The information is based on the Global Custodian magazine’s “2006 Agent Banks in Major and Emerging Markets Survey”. The survey is 
based on nearly 10,000 responses worldwide. A custodian must secure a minimum number of responses from institutional clients in each market in 
order to be listed in the survey. Some custodians which specialise in certain market segments, such as retail consumers, do not participate in this 
survey. Only surveyed markets are included in this chart, although there are other markets (usually small) with stock exchanges and custodians.53
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Swaziland Tunisia Uganda United
Arab
Emirates
Zambia Zimbabwe Total 
presence
                    1  1
        
×
         
1  2
            ×         1  3
×                     1  4
              ×         1  5
                       1  6
1  7
         
×




             
1 10
               ×  × × 7 11
                       2 12
                      
1 13
        
×
        
1 14
    ××× ×     ×   1 1 15
          1 16
        
1 17
         ×     1 18
×       ×       3 19
    ×          × 5 20
  ×     × ×     3 21
                  1 22
4 1 1111 1 5 1 31 1 1 2 4 7  54
ECB 
Occasional Paper No 68
August 2007
ANNEX 5
Custodian banks in the Americas
Countries
Custodian banks
Argentina Bermuda Brazil Canada Chile Colombia
 1 Banco  Bradesco   ×    
 2 Banco de Crédito del Peru            
 3 Banco  de  la  Produccíon       
 4 Banco  Itau   ×    
 5 Banco  Real ×    
 6 Banco Rio de la Plata ×          
 7 Banco Santander   × × ×
 8 Banco  Wiese  Sudameris       
 9 BankBoston × × ×  
10 Bank of New York  
11 Bank of Nova  
12 BBVA  Bancomer       
13 Brown  Brothers  Harriman       
14 CIBC Mellon ×
15 Citigroup × ××××
16 Deutsche  Bank × ×    
17 FirstCaribbean International Bank      
18 HSBC × × ×    
19 JP Morgan    
20 RBC Dexia Investor Services ×    
21 Swiss  American  Securities    
22 Unibanco União Bancos Brasileiros ×      
  Total custodian banks per country 518332
Notes: The information is based on the Global Custodian magazine’s “2006 Agent Banks in Major and Emerging Markets Survey”. The 
survey is based on nearly 10,000 responses worldwide. A custodian must secure a minimum number of responses from institutional 
clients in each market in order to be listed in the survey. Some custodians which specialise in certain market segments, such as retail 
consumers, do not participate in this survey. Only surveyed markets are included in this chart, although there are other markets (usually 
small) with stock exchanges and custodians.55
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Ecuador Jamaica Mexico Panama Peru USA Uruguay Venezuela Total 
presence
        1  1
    ×    1  2
×        1  3
        1  4
        1  5
        1  6
×   × 5  7
    ×    1  8
     ×  4  9
     ×  1 10
 ×    1 11
 ×      × 2 12
   ×  1 13
 1 14
×× ×  × 9 15
        2 16
 ×      1 17
   ×     4 18
     ×   1 19
        1 20
     ×  1 21
        1 22
12312513 4 2  56
ECB 
Occasional Paper No 68
August 2007
REFERENCES
Benjamin, J. and M. Yates (2003), The law of global custody: Legal risk management in securities 
investment and collateral, second edition, Butterworths, UK.
BIS (2007), Quarterly Review, March.
ECB (2005), “The ESCB-CESR Standards for securities clearing and settlement in the European 
Union”, Monthly Bulletin, April.
ECB (2006), “Business continuity oversight expectations for systemically important payment 
systems (SIPS)”, June.
Groenfeld, T. (2005), “New growth for old Europe”, Institutional Investor, September.
Group of Ten (2001), “Report on consolidation in the financial sector”, January (available at 
www.bis.org, www.imf.org and www.oecd.org).
International Securities Services Association (2001), “Report on Global Custody Risks”, 
June (reproduced by the ISSA Secretariat from the “Report on the 6th ISSA Symposium”, 
24-27 May 1992).
Krijgsman, P. (1994), “A Brief History – IPMA’s role in harmonising international capital markets, 
1984-1994” (http://www.ipma.org.uk/pdfs/History%20of%20IPMA.PDF).
Russo, D. and S. Rosati (2007), “Market integration in the post-trade industry: Lessons from 
Europe”, in Shahin Shojai (ed.): World of Exchanges: Adapting to a New Environment, 
Euromoney Books, London.
Russo D., S. Rosati, C. Papathanassiou and G. Caviglia (2007), “Prudential and oversight 
requirements for securities settlement: A comparison of CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations with 
other regulatory regimes”, ECB Occasional Paper Series, forthcoming.
Schmiedel, H. and A. Schönenberger (2005), “Integration of securities market infrastructures in 
the euro area”, ECB Occasional Paper No 33, July.
World Federation of Exchanges (2006), Annual Report (available at www.world-exchanges.
org).
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2003), “Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to 
Strengthen the Resilience of the U.S. Financial System” (available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/studies/34-47638.htm).57
ECB 







OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 
1  “The impact of the euro on money and bond markets” by J. Santillán, M. Bayle and
C. Thygesen, July 2000.
2  “The effective exchange rates of the euro” by L. Buldorini, S. Makrydakis and C. Thimann, 
February 2002.
3  “Estimating the trend of M3 income velocity underlying the reference value for monetary 
growth” by C. Brand, D. Gerdesmeier and B. Roffia, May 2002.
4  “Labour force developments in the euro area since the 1980s” by V. Genre and
R. Gómez-Salvador, July 2002.
5  “The evolution of clearing and central counterparty services for exchange-traded derivatives 
in the United States and Europe: a comparison” by D. Russo, T. L. Hart and A. Schönenberger, 
September 2002.
6  “Banking integration in the euro area” by I. Cabral, F. Dierick and J. Vesala, 
December 2002.
7  “Economic relations with regions neighbouring the euro area in the ‘Euro Time Zone’” by   
F. Mazzaferro, A. Mehl, M. Sturm, C. Thimann and A. Winkler, December 2002.
8  “An introduction to the ECB’s survey of professional forecasters” by J. A. Garcia, 
September 2003.
9  “Fiscal adjustment in 1991-2002: stylised facts and policy implications” by M. G. Briotti, 
February 2004.
10  “The acceding countries’ strategies towards ERM II and the adoption of the euro: an analytical 
review” by a staff team led by P. Backé and C. Thimann and including O. Arratibel, O. Calvo-
Gonzalez, A. Mehl and C. Nerlich, February 2004.
11  “Official dollarisation/euroisation: motives, features and policy implications of current cases” 
by A. Winkler, F. Mazzaferro, C. Nerlich and C. Thimann, February 2004.
12  “Understanding the impact of the external dimension on the euro area: trade, capital flows 
and other international macroeconomic linkages“ by R. Anderton, F. di Mauro and F. Moneta, 
March 2004.
13  “Fair value accounting and financial stability” by a staff team led by A. Enria and including 
L. Cappiello, F. Dierick, S. Grittini, A. Maddaloni, P. Molitor, F. Pires and P. Poloni, 
April 2004.
14  “Measuring financial integration in the euro area” by L. Baele, A. Ferrando, P. Hördahl,   
E. Krylova, C. Monnet, April 2004.58
ECB 
Occasional Paper No 68
August 2007
15  “Quality adjustment of European price statistics and the role for hedonics” by H. Ahnert and 
G. Kenny, May 2004.
16  “Market dynamics associated with credit ratings: a literature review” by F. Gonzalez, F. Haas, 
R. Johannes, M. Persson, L. Toledo, R. Violi, M. Wieland and C. Zins, June 2004.
17 “Corporate ‘excesses’ and financial market dynamics” by A. Maddaloni and D. Pain, 
July 2004.
18  “The international role of the euro: evidence from bonds issued by non-euro area residents” 
by A. Geis, A. Mehl and S. Wredenborg, July 2004.
19  “Sectoral specialisation in the EU: a macroeconomic perspective” by MPC task force of the 
ESCB, July 2004.
20  “The supervision of mixed financial services groups in Europe” by F. Dierick, August 2004.
21 “Governance of securities clearing and settlement systems” by D. Russo, T. Hart, 
M. C. Malaguti and C. Papathanassiou, October 2004.
22  “Assessing potential output growth in the euro area: a growth accounting perspective” by 
A. Musso and T. Westermann, January 2005.
23  “The bank lending survey for the euro area” by J. Berg, A. van Rixtel, A. Ferrando, G. de 
Bondt and S. Scopel, February 2005.
24  “Wage diversity in the euro area: an overview of labour cost differentials across industries” 
by V. Genre, D. Momferatou and G. Mourre, February 2005.
25  “Government debt management in the euro area: recent theoretical developments and changes 
in practices” by G. Wolswijk and J. de Haan, March 2005.
26  “The analysis of banking sector health using macro-prudential indicators” by L. Mörttinen,   
P. Poloni, P. Sandars and J. Vesala, March 2005.
27  “The EU budget – how much scope for institutional reform?” by H. Enderlein, J. Lindner,   
O. Calvo-Gonzalez, R. Ritter, April 2005. 
28  “Reforms in selected EU network industries” by R. Martin, M. Roma, I. Vansteenkiste,   
April 2005.
29  “Wealth and asset price effects on economic activity”, by F. Altissimo, E. Georgiou,  T. Sastre, 
M. T. Valderrama, G. Sterne, M. Stocker, M. Weth, K. Whelan, A. Willman, June 2005.
30  “Competitiveness and the export performance of the euro area”, by a Task Force of the 
Monetary Policy Committee of the European System of Central Banks, June 2005.
31  “Regional monetary integration in the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)” 
by M. Sturm and N. Siegfried, June 2005.59
ECB 






32  “Managing financial crises in emerging market economies: experience with the involvement 
of private sector creditors” by an International Relations Committee task force, July 2005.
33 “Integration of securities market infrastructures in the euro area” by H. Schmiedel, 
A. Schönenberger, July 2005.
34  “Hedge funds and their implications for financial stability” by T. Garbaravicius and F. Dierick, 
August 2005.
35  “The institutional framework for financial market policy in the USA seen from an EU 
perspective” by R. Petschnigg, September 2005. 
36  “Economic and monetary integration of the new Member  States: helping to chart the route” 
by J. Angeloni, M. Flad and F. P. Mongelli, September 2005.
37  “Financing conditions in the euro area” by L. Bê Duc, G. de Bondt, A. Calza, D. Marqués 
Ibáñez, A. van Rixtel and S. Scopel, September 2005.
38 “Economic reactions to public finance consolidation: a survey of the literature” by 
M. G. Briotti, October 2005.
39  “Labour productivity in the Nordic EU countries: a comparative overview and explanatory 
factors – 1998-2004” by A. Annenkov and C. Madaschi, October 2005.
40 “What does European institutional integration tell us about trade integration?” by 
F. P. Mongelli, E. Dorrucci and I. Agur, December 2005.
41 “Trends and patterns in working time across euro area countries 1970-2004: causes 
and consequences” by N. Leiner-Killinger, C. Madaschi and M. Ward-Warmedinger, 
December 2005.
42  “The New Basel Capital Framework and its implementation in the European Union” by 
F. Dierick, F. Pires, M. Scheicher and K. G. Spitzer, December 2005.
43  “The accumulation of foreign reserves” by an International Relations Committee Task Force, 
February 2006.
44  “Competition, productivity and prices in the euro area services sector” by a Task Force of the 
Monetary Policy Committee of the European System of Central banks, April 2006.
45  “Output growth differentials across the euro area countries: Some stylised facts” by N. Benalal, 
J. L. Diaz del Hoyo, B. Pierluigi and N. Vidalis, May 2006.
46  “Inflation persistence and price-setting behaviour in the euro area – a summary of the IPN 
evidence”, by F. Altissimo, M. Ehrmann and F. Smets, June 2006.
47  “The reform and implementation of the stability and growth pact” by R. Morris, H. Ongena 
and L. Schuknecht, June 2006. 60
ECB 
Occasional Paper No 68
August 2007
48  “Macroeconomic and financial stability challenges for acceding and candidate countries” by 
the International Relations Committee Task Force on Enlargement, July 2006.
49  “Credit risk mitigation in central bank operations and its effects on financial markets: the case 
of the Eurosystem” by U. Bindseil and F. Papadia, August 2006.
50  “Implications for liquidity from innovation and transparency in the European corporate bond 
market” by M. Laganá, M. Peřina, I. von Köppen-Mertes and A. Persaud, August 2006. 
51  “Macroeconomic implications of demographic developments in the euro area” by A. Maddaloni, 
A. Musso, P. Rother, M. Ward-Warmedinger and T. Westermann, August 2006.
52 “Cross-border labour mobility within an enlarged EU” by F. F. Heinz and M. Ward-
Warmedinger, October 2006.
53  “Labour productivity developments in the euro area” by R. Gomez-Salvador, A. Musso, 
M. Stocker and J. Turunen, October 2006.
54  “Quantitative quality indicators for statistics – an application to euro area balance of payment 
statistics” by V. Damia and C. Picón Aguilar, November 2006
55 “Globalisation and euro area trade: Interactions and challenges” by U. Baumann and 
F. di Mauro, February 2007.
56  “Assessing fiscal soundness: Theory and practice” by N. Giammarioli, C. Nickel, P. Rother, 
J.-P. Vidal, March 2007.
57  “Understanding price developments and consumer price indices in south-eastern Europe” by 
S. Herrmann and E. K. Polgar, March 2007.
58 “Long-Term Growth Prospects for the Russian Economy” by R. Beck, A. Kamps 
and E. Mileva, March 2007.
59  “The ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) a review after eight years’ experience”, 
by C. Bowles, R. Friz, V. Genre, G. Kenny, A. Meyler and T. Rautanen, April 2007.
60  “Commodity price fluctuations and their impact on monetary and fiscal policies in Western 
and Central Africa” by U. Böwer, A. Geis and A. Winkler, April 2007.
61  “Determinants of growth in the central and eastern European EU Member States – A production 
function approach” by O. Arratibel, F. Heinz, R. Martin, M. Przybyla, L. Rawdanowicz, 
R. Serafini and T. Zumer, April 2007. 
62 “Inflation-linked bonds from a Central Bank perspective” by J. A. Garcia and 
  A. van Rixtel, June 2007.
63  “Corporate finance in the euro area – including background material”, Task Force of the
  Monetary Policy Committee of the European System of Central Banks, June 2007.61
ECB 






64  “The use of portfolio credit risk models in central banks”, Task Force of the Market Operations 
  Committee of the European System of Central Banks, July 2007.
65  “The performance of credit rating systems in the assessment of collateral used in Eurosystem 
  monetary policy operations” by F. Coppens, F. González and G. Winkler, July 2007.
66  “Structural reforms in EMU and the role of monetary policy – a survey of the literature” by 
  N. Leiner-Killinger, V. López Pérez, R. Stiegert and G. Vitale, July 2007.
67  “Towards harmonised balance of payments and international investment position statistics –   
  the experience of the European compilers” by J.-M. Israël and C. Sánchez Muñoz, July 2007.
68  “The securities custody industry” by D. Chan, F. Fontan, S. Rosati and D. Russo, 
 August  2007.ISSN 1607148-4
9 771607 148006
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES
NO 68 / AUGUST 2007
THE SECURITIES CUSTODY 
INDUSTRY
by Diana Chan, Florence Fontan, 
Simonetta Rosati and Daniela Russo